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5Executive summary 
Europe’s labour markets and the world of work in general 
are being transformed by the megatrends of globalisation, 
the fragmentation of the production and value chain, 
demographic ageing, new societal aspirations and the 
digitalisation of the economy. This Issue Paper presents 
the	findings	and	policy	recommendations	of	“The	future	of	
work – Towards a progressive agenda for all”, a European 
Policy Centre research project. Its main objectives were to 
expand public knowledge about these profound changes and 
to reverse the negative narrative often associated with this 
topic. It aimed to show how human decisions and the right 
policies can mitigate upcoming disruptions and provide 
European and national policymakers with a comprehensive 
toolkit for a progressive agenda for the new world of work. 
There have been numerous studies, much media attention 
and intense debate among policymakers, labour market 
players and experts about the future of work – and for good 
reason. The sensitivity of the topic is high, the challenges  
are tremendous and policy solutions are still at an 
experimental stage. 
Building	upon	previous	research,	the	following	five	
chapters aim to take an in-depth look at labour market 
transformations, not least by examining the dual effects of 
the changing structure of the labour market, the growing 
importance of new forms of work and the implications of 
these changes for the workforce. 
Chapter 1 analyses the shifts brought about by the fourth 
industrial revolution and the technologies that underpin it. 
It	presents	the	findings	of	academic	literature	on	the	topic,	
takes a general look at the labour market and homes in on 
four industrial sectors: (health)care, media and publishing, 
transport and logistics, and security and defence. 
The	analysis	identifies	both	common	trends	and	
sector-specific	characteristics	and	variations.	Among	
the	common	trends,	research	findings	show	that	
job displacement and labour market polarisation 
will intensify, whereas current evidence on job loss 
is ambivalent. Another trend is the increased mix 
and	diversification	of	work	arrangements.	Atypical	
employment is not new; it pre-dated both the 
digitalisation of the economy and the 2008 economic 
crisis, and the resulting labour market deregulation 
provided fertile ground for its expansion. New forms of 
work are now further enabled by the fourth industrial 
revolution and its associated technologies. The 
combination of these two developments – labour market 
polarisation	and	the	diversification	of	work	arrangements	
– has major implications for Europe’s economic and 
social models. They give rise to a new techno-economic 
paradigm and require systemic changes to how labour 
markets and welfare states are organised and interact 
with	one	another.	At	a	time	of	fierce	global	competition,	a	
number of challenges will arise or escalate, especially the 
need for technological leadership in Europe, new skillset 
requirements among workers and the question of how to 
train and organise an increasingly volatile workforce. 
In a sectoral analysis, Chapter 1 shows that both 
the intensity of labour market polarisation and the 
diversification	of	work	arrangements	vary	and	thus	have	
a differentiated impact across countries and industries. 
Such variations are driven by a complex set of factors, not 
least the regulatory environment of each given sector, 
the structure and age of its workforce, labour costs, public 
acceptance of new technologies and workers’ involvement 
in strategic decisions. Examining how such factors interact 
with one another is vital to understanding potential future 
dynamics and technological impact facing each industrial 
sector. Chapter 1 therefore stresses the need for an overall 
strategy towards the future of work, a general understanding 
of the transformations at play and a set of sectoral 
approaches that should offer tailor-made solutions. 
Chapter	2	studies	the	profiles	of	atypical	workers,	examines	
the implications of their arrangements for working 
conditions and access to social protection, and asks, 
crucially, whether they will form the new precariat of  
21st century labour markets. 
Drawing	a	profile	of	atypical	workers	is	not	easy,	for	several	
reasons. First, they comprise several sub-categories and 
their development responds to different logics. Second, 
while previously established trends still hold true today, 
new	ones	arise	and	make	the	identification	of	clear	patterns	
difficult.	For	instance,	while	atypical	employment	is	
generally over-represented in certain economic sectors 
such as agriculture, the arts and entertainment, the sub-
category of platform workers is mainly found in sectors that 
have been deeply impacted by digitalisation. Interestingly, 
the evidence also suggests that the population engaged 
in atypical employment is ageing and that the share of 
high	skilled	people	has	increased	significantly.	As	regards	
gender, different patterns apply to different groups: while 
self-employed people are predominantly male, part-time 
workers are mainly female, and the gender distribution 
is roughly equal among temporary workers. The growing 
representation of high skilled women in each of these 
categories is noteworthy. All of this tends to contradict 
the popular view that atypical employment is largely the 
domain of young, inexperienced and low skilled workers. 
On the contrary, it appears that tertiary education no longer 
shields people from unstable jobs, which used to be the case 
in yesterday’s labour market.
Generally speaking, atypical workers do face worse working 
conditions, have less social protection and bargaining  
power than standard workers, and this increases their  
risk of becoming the new precariat of the 21st century, 
as long as no proper actions are undertaken. Yet, given 
the great diversity of atypical workers and social welfare 
systems in Europe, treating them as a homogenous group 
would be misleading. Atypical employment is diverse and 
the	situation	differs	significantly	from	one	country	to	
another. In fact, some countries have managed to narrow 
the social protection gap between atypical workers and 
standard employees, thus showing that public policies 
matter in that respect. 
6Chapter 3 stresses the lasting repercussions of a changing 
world of work and the decoupling of employment from 
social protection. Not only will this create new types of 
socioeconomic risk for individuals, it also adds pressure 
on the welfare state and tests the resilience of the social 
contract. Mental health disorders have become a more 
salient issue in the 21st century, and these disorders may 
impact atypical workers disproportionately, in particular 
the self-employed, due to fears and anxieties about job 
security, lack of predictability and income insecurity in 
old age as well as a higher risk of social exclusion. Mental 
(ill)health has huge societal costs, too. Furthermore, the 
decoupling of employment from social protection reduces 
the number of people who effectively contribute to the 
welfare system, thus aggravating the already unsustainable 
relationship	between	welfare	beneficiaries	and	
contributors. This further undermines the social contract 
and its redistributive principle at a time when technologies 
are accelerating the polarisation of the labour market and 
the erosion of the middle class.
Chapter 4 shows how the changing nature of work has 
crystallised public attention in recent years and fostered 
numerous initiatives undertaken at different policy levels 
and by various actors. It reveals the discrepancy between  
the established functioning of our welfare regimes, new 
socioeconomic realities and the transitory nature of the 
current	phase,	where	numerous	actors	attempt	to	fill	gaps,	
address workers’ claims and/or provide their own solutions 
to systemic problems. While many measures might be 
useful in the short term to relieve some workers’ grievances, 
without coordination, the multiplicity of initiatives and 
actors can raise the risk of piecemeal measures rather 
than	foster	a	fully-fledged	strategy	on	how	to	address	the	
ever more complex realities of today’s world of work. The 
question	of	how	to	define	a	social	contract	that	is	fit	for	the	
future should lie at the core of such strategy.
Chapter 4 also shows how the future of work is gradually 
making its mark on the reform agenda of public authorities. 
While inspiring reforms take place at the national level, the 
EU and international levels are also paying more attention 
to the effects of labour market transformations. As for 
the European level, recent measures – in particular the 
increased focus on digital skills as well as the European 
Pillar of Social Rights and its mainstreaming into the 
European	Semester	and	EU	financing	instruments	–	
represent major policy developments. However, the success 
of the EU future of work agenda is highly dependent on the 
cooperation with and/or support of other players, such as 
national authorities, courts of justice, and social partners. 
Based on the evidence and analysis provided in the paper, 
Chapter 5 offers policymakers a toolkit for a progressive 
agenda on the future of work. This agenda enables a new 
alignment between the functioning of the welfare state and 
the impact of technological progress, thus putting an end 
to the current phase that is gradually dismantling the social 
contract, in favour of a conscious, mature and controlled 
deployment of new technologies. This agenda will need to 
rest on an inclusive and competitive labour market and a 
social protection system acting in a virtuous relationship, 
as presented in the diagram below. To make such a virtuous 
circle possible, a number of concrete actions and systemic 
reforms will need to be carried out at different levels of 
decision-making.
Despite the limited scope of the EU’s competences in this 
area, its role in steering a progressive agenda on the future 
of work, mobilising the forces of change and deploying 
cross-cutting instruments should not be underestimated. 
Both the current polarisation of the labour market and 
the decoupling of employment and social protection are 
likely to leave an indelible mark on European economies 
and societies. By meeting the challenges posed by the 
fourth industrial revolution, the EU would not only boost 
its economy, curb mounting divergences across European 
territories and people and preserve its core values of 
solidarity and equality. It would also act as a driving force 
for innovative and progressive changes, thus strengthening 
its	nomative	power	and	influence	at	the	global	level	and	
reinforcing citizens’ trust in its ability to address their fears 
and anxieties.
ALIGNMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES, WELFARE STATE REFORMS
AND WORKING STRUCTURES
A future-fit
social
protection
system
Align the social protection system
with life-course transitions
Establish a social level
playing field for all workers
Increase people’s
financial resilience
Sustain the social contract
through fair taxation
An inclusive
and
competitive
labour
market
Make learning a duty
and a right for all
Shape the talents
of the 21st century
Make social dialogue an enabler
of industrial transformations
Introduction
European labour markets and society at large are going 
through profound transformations that are shaking the 
old foundations of European welfare states. These shifts 
are the outcome of a set of closely intertwined trends: 
globalisation and trade; the resulting fragmentation 
of the production chain; the disaggregation of tasks 
and the outsourcing of certain economic activities to 
other world regions; digitalisation and a rapid spread 
of new technologies; demographic ageing; as well as 
new societal aspirations and preferences, not least in 
regard to the purpose and meaning of work; workplace 
relationships and work-life balance.
This	Issue	Paper	presents	the	main	findings	and	policy	
recommendations of the European Policy Centre (EPC) 
research	project	entitled	“The	future	of	work	– Towards 
a progressive agenda for all”. This research project 
started at the onset of 2018 when the public attention 
to the phenomena dubbed the ‘Uberisation’ of the 
economy was at its height and the concept of ‘future 
of work’ led to a multitude of studies attempting to 
describe,	define	and	understand	the	different	elements	
and aspects of it. Simultaneously, public authorities 
were under pressure to act and express their readiness 
to address the fears and concerns associated with the 
changing nature of work.
This EPC project, through its independent research 
as well as its numerous public debates and expert 
workshops, has contributed to an improved 
understanding of the complexity of ongoing labour 
market transformations and raised awareness on the 
resulting policy challenges. 
The project’s objective was twofold. Firstly, it aimed to 
reverse the negative perception of the ‘future of work’ in 
the	public	debate	through	the	identification	of	possible	
solutions. To this day, the notion still sparks anxiety and 
resistance and is often associated with job loss, increasing 
precarity, rising inequality and a polarised labour market. 
Secondly, it looked at labour market transformations 
comprehensively, thus avoiding the separation of closely 
interrelated issues and challenges that have large 
implications for the future of European societies. 
Following	this	approach,	“The	future	of	work”	project	was	
structured	around	two	pillars.	It	first	analysed	the	impact	
of the so-called fourth industrial revolution on the overall 
structure of the labour market. It also adopted a sectoral 
approach	by	analysing	its	effects	on	specific	industrial	
sectors: i.e. (health)care, media and publishing, transport 
and logistics, as well as security and defence. Priority was 
given to the human-related impact, namely the labour 
force working in these industries, by exploring how new 
technologies are transforming workers’ job prospects and 
working patterns.
The second pillar of the research was to analyse 
new forms of work, atypical workers’ access to social 
protection, and their implications for the future design 
of the social protection system. Thus, linking the 
double effects of the fourth industrial revolution on the 
structure of the labour market and the emergence of 
new forms of work was a deliberate choice. In fact, both 
of	them	pose	significant	challenges	to	labour	market	
institutions, the sustainability of our welfare states, the 
functioning of our societies and the ‘glue’ that is holding 
it together, often referred to as the social contract. 
Extensive research has already been done on the fourth 
industrial revolution and the disruptive effects of its 
accompanying technologies on the labour market. 
The unfolding technological revolution builds on the 
outcomes of the foregoing third industrial revolution 
and its information and communication technologies 
(ICTs), with a new asset fuelling the unprecedented wave 
of innovation – data. 
As precious metals and oil were once the engines of 
economy	in	the	19th and 20th centuries, digital data is 
propelling the present transformation and is probably 
the world’s most valuable resource today. Rooted in the 
widespread availability, storage and processing of data, 
the fourth industrial revolution is characterised by the 
emergence of new technologies that have the potential 
to bridge the digital, physical, and biological spheres and 
to steer the physical world through a virtual one created 
thanks to digitalisation. Thus, mastering data through 
digitalisation gives rise to new innovations such as the 
Internet of things (IoT),1	artificial	intelligence	(AI)2 and 
exponential increases in computing ability, enabling 
mankind to make major progress not only in human 
sciences (e.g. medicine, genomic research) but also in 
the optimisation of production tools, decision-making 
and services.
The changes triggered by this fourth industrial 
revolution are thought to be potentially unparalleled. 
Compared to the preceding third revolution and 
previous major industrial transformations, the present 
wave of innovation is evolving at an exponential pace, 
disrupting almost every industry and sector with both 
direct and indirect impacts on almost every aspect of 
today’s economic and societal life.
This	Issue	Paper	is	composed	of	five	main	chapters.	 
The authors depict the impact of new technologies 
on the labour market and its workforce following both 
a	general	and	sectoral-specific	approach	(Chapter	1)	
before examining its relation to new forms of work and 
their consequences as regards working conditions as 
well as the access to and coverage of social protection 
(Chapter 2). The numerous implications of such changes 
are discussed, with respect to the sustainability of 
European welfare states, our social contract and the  
new types of socioeconomic risks individuals might  
face (Chapter 3). 
Subsequently, a number of policy responses that 
have been undertaken by various players over the last 
7
8years to address labour market transformations at 
the international, European and national levels are 
highlighted (Chapter 4). It also draws conclusions on 
what such a proliferation of initiatives and actors reveals 
regarding the welfare state’s ability to address and adapt 
to such transformations. Finally, the authors focus on 
possible solutions to align the functioning of the welfare 
state with the new world of work while discussing their 
implications for Europe’s social contract and pointing 
out in which respective areas EU actions could become 
an enabler of a progressive agenda on the future of work. 
(Chapter 5).
9Chapter 1: The impact of new technologies on jobs
The unfolding industrial revolution fuelled by data 
and digital technologies, together with changing 
demographics and an increasingly integrated world 
economy are the major forces at work currently shaping 
the labour market structure,3 and are undoubtedly having 
big effects on the way we live and work. This chapter 
concentrates on the impact of new technologies on the 
overall structure of the labour market, before taking a 
snapshot of four industrial sectors.
1.1  A CHANGING LABOUR MARKET 
STRUCTURE
Before taking into consideration the effects of new 
technologies on the labour market structure, it is useful  
to take a closer look at the developments of the last 
decade,	when	significant	shifts	occurred	as	a	result	of	
the	2008	financial	and	economic	crisis.	This	analysis	
will provide a broader context in which technological 
advances operate today. 
1.1.1  The scarring effect of the financial and 
economic crisis4 
In the immediate aftermath of the 2008 crisis, the EU 
unemployment rate5	rose	sharply	from	9%	in	2009	to	
10.9%	in	2013,	with	shocking	figures	in	those	countries	
affected	the	most	(i.e.	Greece,	27.5%;	Spain,	26.1%;	
Portugal,	16.4%).	European	labour	markets	slowly	started	
recovering from the prolonged recession following the 
2008 crisis in late 2013. After reaching its post-crisis peak 
in 2013, unemployment started to decrease in most EU 
member states. Overall, in all EU countries (EU28), the 
unemployment	rate	fell	from	its	2013	peak	of	10.9%	to	
6.8%	in	2018.	Despite	this	positive	trend,	unemployment	
remains high in a large number of EU countries. Three 
member	states	–	Greece	(19.3%),	Spain	(15.3%)	and	Italy	
(10.6%)	–	still	had	an	unemployment	level	above	10%	in	
2018. A similar trend can be observed over the last decade 
with the youth unemployment rate, which after peaking 
in	2013	(23.7%)	has	decreased	on	average	in	the	EU28.	
However, when taking a closer look at the disaggregated 
figures,	it	becomes	clear	that	some	countries	have	suffered	
more than others in this respect and experienced sharp 
increases in youth unemployment. Greece, Cyprus and 
Italy are the three member states where the 2018 youth 
unemployment rate still stands higher than what it was in 
2009	(Greece,	39.9%	against	25.7%;	Cyprus,	20.2%	against	
13.8;	Italy,	32.2%	against	25.3%).6
In 2018, the EU28 employment rate for persons aged 15 
to	64	was	at	73.7%,	reaching	the	highest	average	ever	
recorded in the last decade. Behind such a positive result, 
however,	significant	country	variations	remain,	with	the	
best performers (i.e. the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, 
Germany)	reaching	77%	and	more,	while	other	countries	
were	still	lagging	with	rates	below	70%	(i.e.	Croatia	at	66.3%,	
Romania	at	67.8%,	Greece	at	68.2%,	Belgium	at	68.6%).	Italy	
recorded	the	lowest	rate	among	EU	countries	with	65.6%.
A ‘health check’ of the labour market also implies going 
beyond the question of the level of employment. In 
this respect, although the employment rate has now 
reached	pre-crisis	levels,	the	effects	of	the	financial	
and economic crisis (combined with other major forces) 
on working patterns and contractual arrangements 
remain engraved in the labour market. These changes 
can	be	quantified	by	a	dynamic	increase	of	‘atypical	
employment’ (see Infobox 1).
A ‘health check’ of the labour market 
implies going beyond the question of 
the level of employment. In this respect, 
although the employment rate has now 
reached pre-crisis levels, the effects of the 
financial and economic crisis (combined 
with other major forces) on working 
patterns and contractual arrangements 
remain engraved in the labour market. 
From 2002 to 2018, the number of atypical workers grew 
by	23.4%.10 In 2015, these forms of work reached their 
peak	with	a	share	of	45.7%	of	the	total	employment	in	
the	EU28.	They	then	started	to	decrease	slowly	(-2%	of	
growth)	and	stood	at	44.8%	in	2018	(see	Figure	1,	page	10).	
When breaking down the change and looking in details at 
the three different categories of atypical employment, it 
appears that the increasing trend of atypical forms of work 
between 2002 and 2018 was mainly fuelled by part-time 
and temporary employment, which both experienced 
INFOBOX 1. What is atypical employment?
Atypical employment is defined by the European Observatory 
of Working Life (EurWORK) as “employment relationships that 
do not conform to the standard […] model of full-time, regular, 
open-ended employment with a single employer over a long 
time span”.7 According to this definition, atypical employment 
includes part-time work, self-employment and temporary  
work. Self-employment, in turn, can be differentiated into  
two basic subcategories: self-employed workers without 
employees (i.e. own-account workers) and self-employed 
workers with employees. 
It is also worth mentioning a particular category of atypical 
employment which comprises persons in the grey area 
between employment and self-employment, the so-called 
(economically) dependent self-employed. The International 
Labour Organization (ILO) defines dependent self-employed as 
those workers “who do not meet one or more of the following 
criteria: (1) they have more than one client; (2) they have the 
authority to hire staff, and/or (3) they have the authority to make 
important strategic decisions about how to run the business.”8  
In its 2017 Labour Force Survey (LFS) ad hoc module on  
self-employment, Eurostat provided an operational definition of 
economically dependent self-employed “as the self-employed 
without employees who worked during the last 12 months for 
only one client or for a dominant client, and this client decided 
about their working hours.”9
significant	growth	(i.e.	+36.6%	and	+30.4%	respectively).	
Similarly, the atypical work categories’ share of the total 
employment increased substantially over the reference 
period	(i.e.	+23.3%	and	+17.8%	respectively).	
The increasing trend of atypical forms  
of work between 2002 and 2018 was  
mainly fuelled by part-time and  
temporary employment.
Meanwhile, the share of self-employment on the total labour 
force	registered	a	6%	negative	growth	in	the	same	reference	
period. Nonetheless, when studying the evolution of self-
employment, the total number of self-employed workers has 
increased	by	4.1%	over	the	reference	period.	When	breaking	
down	this	figure	into	the	different	categories	of	self-
employment – namely, self-employed with employees and 
self-employed without employees (own-account workers) – 
it becomes clear that this rise was caused by the increase in 
the	latter	(+13.3%).	In	fact,	over	the	same	reference	period,	
self-employment	with	employees	fell	by	13.7%.
As mentioned earlier, atypical employment reached 
its peak in 2015 after a prolonged period of economic 
recession. As unemployment increased in most European 
member states, active labour market policies pressured 
the unemployed to accept atypical forms of employment.12 
New	forms	of	work	were	preferred	due	to	their	flexibility	
and	ability	to	combat	fluctuations	in	labour	demand.	This	
line of argumentation is also pursued by the European 
Trade Union Institute (ETUI),13 which demonstrated 
that	in	order	to	introduce	greater	flexibility	and	reduce	
unemployment, most national governments introduced 
reforms that downgraded labour law standards. As per 
example, in 2013, the Spanish government introduced 
so-called	generational	contracts	which	entailed	a	100%	
cut in social security contribution for young entrepreneurs 
recruiting long-term jobseekers.14 
1.1.2  The impact of new technologies on the  
labour market
Without any doubts, the fourth industrial revolution  
(see Infobox 2) – based on the deployment of digitalisation, 
the application of data to old and new technologies,  
and the combination of complex technological  
innovation	–	has	the	potential	to	create	a	significant	
number of disruptive changes going far beyond the 
product level. Instead, it is the entire process related to 
its production, how it is delivered to clients and how work 
and services are organised which are transforming. Our 
economies and societies are already witnessing some of 
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INFOBOX 2: The fourth industrial revolution
The fourth industrial revolution, firstly introduced in 2016 by 
Klaus Schwab, founder and executive chairman of the World 
Economic Forum (WEF), refers to a wave of innovation that 
is blurring the boundaries between the physical, digital and 
biological worlds.15 Based on different criteria, other researchers 
argue that this could even be considered the sixth revolution.16 
Despite such academic disputes, the ongoing revolution will 
inevitably bring about changes and affect how people live  
and work. 
It is worth listing some of the technologies which are shaping 
this process of innovation:
q  The cloud: a global network of servers that is accessible to 
users over the Internet. Cloud storage refers to the large-scale 
storage of data in virtual locations, while cloud computing 
refers to the use of hardware infrastructures which may be 
remotely located.17 
q  Big data: enormous and diverse sets of digitised information 
created and collected at ever-increasing rates.
q  Mobile apps: computer software applications designed to run 
on a mobile device (e.g. smartphones, tablets, watches).
q  Online platforms: an umbrella term which describes a variety 
of services (e.g. marketplaces, social media, application stores). 
In its most basic form, an online platform is a virtual space 
which connects different parties, such as buyers and sellers.
q  IoT: systems exchanging digitised data between objects 
(physical or virtual), which are connected to each other and 
the Internet.
q  AI: the ability of a machine to perform tasks that normally 
requires human intelligence.
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these transformations, but the magnitude of the changes 
is set to become even more large-scale when the level of 
maturity and scope of applicability of the technologies will 
be	enhanced.	This	will	further	influence	labour	demand	
and supply, and the content of work; affect labour market 
relationships and institutions; and have an impact on 
social protection systems and ultimately on the job quality 
and wellbeing of workers. This thereby gives rise to a new 
techno-economic paradigm.18
Fears and concerns about new 
technologies’ transformative potential  
are not new.
Fears and concerns about new technologies’ 
transformative	potential	are	not	new.	Already	in	1931,	
economist John Maynard Keynes warned against the 
potentially disruptive effects that progress would have 
on employment in the short run. The discovery and 
application of new and innovative processes would 
inevitably lead to what he named ‘technological 
unemployment’, a temporary phase of disturbance in the 
labour markets which would affect workers negatively.19 
The same fears and concerns characterise the debate over 
the future of work in a time when the speed, scope and 
impact of the fourth industrial revolution are predicted to 
be of an unprecedented scale. 
It is difficult to assess whether job 
destruction and job creation, generated 
by technological advancements, will 
compensate one another. Surely, this wave 
of innovation will cause job displacement 
in the labour market that will alter its 
existing structure.
In recent years, a number of researchers have tried to 
assess the effects of the deployment of new technologies 
on the labour market, resulting in ambiguous outcomes. 
Frey	and	Osborne	argued	that	up	to	47%	of	existing	jobs	
are at a high risk of being automated within the next 
two decades,20 while a 2016 Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) study lessened 
such a negative prediction, indicating that between 
-6%	and	-12%	of	job	loss	could	be	expected.21 These 
wide discrepancies in outcomes are a result of differing 
research methodologies. While Frey and Osborne 
analysed	the	susceptibility	of	specific	occupations	to	
automation, the OECD study disaggregated occupations 
into tasks, thus analysing which tasks are more likely to 
be automated. It is also important to note that the study 
by Frey and Osborne refers to the US labour market, 
while the latter does a comparative analysis of 21 OECD 
countries.22	Building	on	the	two	findings,	a	more	recent	
OECD study – which also exploits the Survey of Adult 
Skills (PIAAC) to account for the variations in tasks – 
suggests	that	only	14%	of	existing	jobs	are	at	risk	of	
complete automation.23
While studies are pointing to the destructive effects of 
automation on jobs, it is also worth noting that others 
stress the potential of innovation when creating new 
jobs. Vermeulen et al., for example, found that there is 
substantial job creation in sectors such as engineering, 
software	and	scientific	services,	as	well	as	in	sectors	
considered complementary like education, legal work 
and consulting services related to new technologies.24 
It	is	difficult	to	assess	whether	job	destruction	and	job	
creation, generated by technological advancements, will 
compensate one another. Surely, this wave of innovation 
will cause job displacement in the labour market that will 
alter its existing structure.
New technologies influence how labour 
demand and supply meet and contribute to 
the diversification of work arrangements 
and organisational patterns.
In this context, it is also important to mention the 
relationship between new technologies and skills. It has 
been	argued	that	“[t]echnology	is	not	skill-neutral”,25 
as it tends to favour certain skills while making others 
redundant, thus more likely substitutable. Researchers 
have also looked into individual tasks and how these 
could be better performed (i.e. by workers applying 
their skills, or machines). Based on these studies, 
findings	show	that	demand	for	middle	skilled	jobs	
typically entailing routine tasks has decreased over the 
past decades while high and low skilled occupations 
have seen a simultaneous rise.26 The eroding pattern 
of the middle, in terms of occupations and skills, also 
translates into an increasing polarisation of the labour 
market. In an attempt to document job polarisation in 
European countries, Goos, Manning and Salomons found 
that the polarisation caused by technological progress 
and digitalisation has affected middle-level workers the 
most	(e.g.	office	clerks,	metal	and	machinery-related	
work, machine operators and assemblers).27 
New	technologies	also	influence	how	labour	demand	and	
supply	meet	and	contribute	to	the	diversification	of	work	
arrangements and organisational patterns (see Infobox 
3). This is especially true of the recent surge of platform 
work,	defined	as	“a	form	of	employment	that	uses	an	
online platform to enable organisations or individuals 
to access other organisations or individuals to solve 
problems or to provide services in exchange  
for payment.”29
Platform work transforms traditional employment 
relationships and the organisation of work as it introduces 
a new way of coordinating economic activity, namely 
through	digital	platforms,	which	are	defined	as	“digital	
networks that coordinate labour service transactions in an 
algorithmic way.”30 According to recent literature, platform 
work can take multiple forms,31 such as on-location 
platform-determined work (e.g. Uber drivers), on-location 
worker-initiated labour (e.g. ListMinut users),32 or online 
contest	work	(e.g.	99designs).33 
Measuring the evolution of these new forms of work proves 
to	be	a	difficult	task	due	to	the	data	restrictions	of	platform	
companies and the lack of agreement on an appropriate 
estimation methodology. However, the Collaborative 
Economy and Employment (COLLEEM) project survey 
conducted by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the 
European Commission in 2017 aims to solve these issues. 
According	to	the	survey,	around	9.7%	of	workers	provided	
some form of labour service through digital platforms, 
while a more recent JRC study suggests that the number of 
workers who engaged in platform work has increased, from 
9.7%	in	2017	to	11%	in	2018.34 However, when studying the 
number of workers for whom platform work provided more 
than	50%	of	their	income,	they	only	account	for	about	2%	
of the adult population across the EU. 35 
1.1.3  Europe’s place in the global innovation race
When analysing the impact of new technologies on the 
labour market, it is also important to look at innovation 
leadership, given its key implications for competitiveness 
and job creation. It has become clear that in recent years 
the EU has been losing ground at the global level with 
respect to technological advances and the adoption of 
digitally-driven business models. The US, East Asia and 
India outperform Europe when it comes to bringing 
new innovative products to the market and integrating 
advanced digital technologies into their business 
development. For instance, in 2016, Europe was only home 
to	6%	of	the	world’s	60	most	valuable	online	platforms,	
while	the	US	was	home	to	64%	of	them	and	Asian	countries	
31%.36 The EU does not fare better in terms of the number 
of start-up companies that are valued over 1 billion dollars, 
or so-called unicorns. Disparities between the EU, the 
US and China remain stark here as well. In fact, in 2017, 
Europe only had 33 of these ‘unicorns’ while China could 
boast to have 83, and the US a staggering 151.37
This gap can be partially explained by the growing 
divergence in terms of research and development (R&D) 
spending.	From	2009	to	2017,	investment	in	R&D,	
expressed	as	millions	of	euros,	grew	by	43%	in	EU28	
countries,	compared	to	74%	in	the	US	and	302%	in	China.	
While Europe remains the number two investor in R&D 
in	absolute	terms,	recent	trends	confirm	the	lost	ground.38 
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind the high 
geographic variation within Europe, where countries such 
as Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands have innovative 
business sectors and countries like Romania and Bulgaria 
are lagging behind.39
EU industry performance in attracting digital talents also 
faces	hurdles.	In	2018,	53%	of	companies	had	difficulties	
in	filling	vacancies	for	ICT	specialists40 and evidence 
shows that talents in AI, for instance, are concentrated 
in other regions of the world, not least the US and Asia. 
In	that	specific	domain,	we	know	that	AI	has	not	diffused	
yet across all industries and AI specialists are unevenly 
distributed across countries and industries. This unequal 
distribution will potentially become a new source of 
economic divergences in the near future.41
In-work skilling and upskilling are also points of concern, 
in particular when considering digital skills. Eurostat data 
indicates that older workers are those who most need 
digital	training,	with	only	16%	of	them	having	above	basic	
digital	skills,	compared	to	57%	of	16	to	24	years	old.	At	the	
same time, a Zurich Insurance study42 points to the greater 
reluctance of older workers to undertake voluntary skills 
training.	This	highlights	the	difficulty	of	providing	training	
and upskilling for those who need it most. Furthermore, 
when	looking	at	fields	such	as	AI,	comparative	studies43 
indicate	that	it	is	far	more	difficult	to	become	an	AI	
specialist after entering the labour market in the EU than 
in the US. This is mainly because the US labour market 
offers plenty of on-the-job training opportunities and 
online courses that are far more developed than in Europe, 
and does not deter its people from studying something 
completely	different	from	their	original	field	of	study.	
To conclude, European labour markets have been 
experiencing a slow recovery from the prolonged recession 
that followed the 2008 crisis, and despite such positive trend, 
several EU countries still suffer from high unemployment 
rates. While forms of atypical employment already existed 
before the crisis and the massive surge in the deployment of 
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INFOBOX 3. New forms of employment
A research project conducted by the European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) 
in 2015 identified nine (quasi-)new forms of employment:28
q  employee sharing: a group of employers jointly hires an 
individual worker; 
q  job sharing: an employer hires two or more workers to jointly 
perform a specific job; 
q  interim management: highly skilled experts temporarily hired 
for a specific project;
q  casual work: a contractual arrangement allowing an employer 
to call employees on-demand;
q  ICT-based mobile work: thanks to mobile technologies, workers 
perform from any place at any time without having to use the 
employers’ premises;
q  voucher-based work: an employment relationship based on a 
voucher-based model, in which the payment for services is 
done via a voucher that covers both pay and social security 
contributions;
q  portfolio work: a self-employed worker provides services to 
a large number of clients, mostly carrying out small jobs for 
each of them;
q  crowd employment (i.e. platform work): labour broken down into 
small tasks and divided among different workers and services 
provided on-demand as a result of online platforms matching 
employers/clients to workers;
q  collaborative employment: self-employed people or  
micro-enterprises establishing forms of cooperation (e.g. 
coworking spaces) to overcome limitations of size and prevent 
professional isolation.
These nine categories were established in 2015 and could 
continue to evolve depending on a number of factors, including 
technological development. 
13
digital technologies of recent years, they found the perfect 
ground to strive in relatively more deregulated labour 
markets, reaching a peak in 2015. Advances in technological 
innovation	also	influenced	how	labour	demand	and	supply	
meet, thus contributing to the emergence of new forms 
of work and organisational patterns. The effects of the 
fourth industrial revolution and the signs of a new techno-
economic paradigm are already visible, impacting how and 
when people work and the skills required for tomorrow’s 
jobs. Rather than job loss, there is evidence of the effects 
of technologies on job displacement, resulting in a greater 
polarisation of the labour market. At the same time, in an 
age of globalisation and intense competition with the rest of 
the world, the old continent’s chances to compete with other 
regions of the world will depend on its ability to keep up in 
the worldwide innovation race. The new techno-economic 
paradigm does therefore pose the question of how Europe 
can embrace new technologies and digitally-driven business 
models without undermining its attachment to core values 
like equality and solidarity. Before discussing this aspect 
(see Chapter 5), it is worth looking at whether ongoing 
transformations are impacting industrial sectors to the  
same extent. 
1.2  A SECTORAL FOCUS – SNAPSHOTS OF 
INDUSTRIAL SECTORS
Moving beyond the general analysis of ongoing labour 
market transformations and their impact on the labour 
market structure, the following section takes a closer 
look at four industrial sectors: (health)care, media and 
publishing, transport and logistics, as well as security and 
defence. Although digitalisation has and will continue 
to exert cross-cutting effects on the overall economy, 
the impact on workers will vary depending on numerous 
factors, including the current structure of their respective 
sector and the nature of the work they perform. Adopting 
a sectoral approach is imperative to go beyond general 
considerations and ensure that policy measures are 
tailored	to	the	specificities	of	each	industry.
1.2.1  The (health)care sector44 
The	healthcare	and	care	workforce	represents	a	significant	
segment of the European workforce. According to LFS data, 
in 2018, 224.4 million people were employed in the EU28 
while some 24.6 million people were employed in human 
health and social work activities,45	accounting	for	11%	of	
total employment in the EU28 (see Figure 2).
Employment in the healthcare and social 
care sector of the EU28 is on average 
increasing at a steady pace. In fact, this 
growing trend was not affected by the 2008 
economic recession.
Employment in the healthcare and social care sector of 
the EU28 is on average increasing at a steady pace. In fact, 
this growing trend was not affected by the 2008 economic 
recession.	Between	2009	and	2013,	employment	increased	
while total employment declined on average. Almost  
4	million	Europeans	lost	their	jobs	between	2009	and	
2013, while the health and social care sector experienced 
an increase of around one million over that same period  
(see Figure 2).
Over	the	last	decade	(2009-2018),	the	health	and	social	
care workforce constantly increased in absolute terms, 
rising	from	21.5	million	people	in	2009	to	some	 
24.6	million	people	in	2018	(+14.4%).	Its	share	in	the	total	
employment grew by almost 1 percentage point too, going 
from	10%	in	2009	to	11%	in	2018	(see	Figure	2,	page	13).
Interestingly, the health workforce is predominantly 
female.	In	2018,	more	than	19	million	out	of	24.6	million	
employees in the health and social care industry were 
women	(i.e.	78.7%	of	the	total	health	workforce).	By	
NUMBER OF WORKERS IN THE HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE SECTOR
AND THEIR SHARE OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT (2009-2018)
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contrast, the share of female employment in the total 
economy	was	only	46.2%.
In 2018, over half of the care workforce 
was engaged in an atypical form of 
employment, whereas such  
non-standard work arrangements 
accounted for 44.8% of the total economy.
When considering contractual arrangements, it is worth 
noting that in 2018, over half of the care workforce was 
engaged	in	an	atypical	form	of	employment	(54.3%),	
whereas such non-standard work arrangements 
accounted	for	44.8%	of	the	total	economy.	As	regards	
the distribution of different forms of non-standard work 
within the care workforce in comparison to other sectors, 
it is worth noting several trends and divergences. Part-
time employment is more widespread in the care sector 
(33.4%	compared	to	19.2%	in	the	overall	economy	in	
2018), and its share has experienced an increase over the 
last	decade	(+5.5%).	This	is	in	line	with	the	increasing	
trend of part-time employment in the total economy 
(+6.6%).	In	2018,	the	share	of	temporary	employees	
remained	static	(12.1%	in	the	total	economy	and	12.8%	
in the care sector), while self-employed people are less 
represented	in	the	care	sector	(8.1%	compared	to	13.5%	in	
the total economy). Interestingly, the changing patterns 
of self-employment and temporary employment in the 
care sector in the last decade are diverging from the 
general trend of the total economy, with self-employment 
experiencing	a	3.3%	growth	(-6.1%	in	the	total	economy)	
and	temporary	employment	decreasing	by	0.4%	over	the	
decade	(+6.1%	in	the	total	economy).47 
When looking at the growth dynamics of employment 
by professional status in the health and social care 
sector over the last decade, we notice an increase in all 
categories	of	non-standard	work	(+20.6%	for	part-time	
workers,	+13.9%	for	temporary	workers,	+18.1%	for	self-
employed workers). Similarly to the patterns observed 
in the total economy, the growth of the self-employed 
workforce is to be attributed to increased numbers of 
self-employed	workers	without	employees	(+31.9%),	while	
self-employed	workers	with	employees	decreased	by	6%	
over the reference period (see Figure 3).
In terms of educational attainment, in 
2018, the vast majority of health and social 
workers had medium or high education 
backgrounds.
In terms of educational attainment, in 2018, the vast 
majority of health and social workers had medium or high 
education	backgrounds,	with	44.3%	having	completed	
upper	secondary	and	post-secondary	education,	and	44.8%	
having	attained	tertiary	education.	In	2018,	only	10.9%	
of workers in the sector had primary and lower secondary 
education.	From	2009	to	2018,	we	observe	a	noticeable	
divergence in the low and high education categories, with 
a	31.6%	drop	in	the	number	of	low	skilled	workers	and	
a	13.6%	increase	in	the	number	of	high	skilled	workers.	
The	figure	of	middle	skilled	workers	remained	stable	over	
the	decade,	experiencing	a	minimal	decline	on	0.7%.	If	
compared	to	figures	in	total	economy,	the	educational	
attainment of workers in the health and social sector is 
higher than that of the average European worker (in 2018, 
44.8%	of	health	and	social	workers	had	a	tertiary	degree	
compared	to	only	35.1%	of	EU	workers).49
Lastly, the age structure of the workforce also deserves 
some attention, as it raises concerns about future shortages 
of health and social care professionals and the replacement 
30%
40%
20%
10%
0%
Self-employed
with employees
Self-employed
without employees
Total self-employed
workers
Total employment
-10%
-6.0%
31.9%
Part-time workers
20.6%
Total atypical workers
18.6%
Temporary workers
13.9% 14.4%
18.1%
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN THE HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE SECTOR
BY WORK ARRANGEMENT (%, 2009-2018)
 Fig. 3 
Source: Authors, based on Eurostat48
15
of the workforce. On average, the professionals of this 
sector are older than the total workforce. In 2018, workers 
aged	50	years	or	older	accounted	for	more	than	37%	of	the	
health	and	social	care	workforce,	as	opposed	to	33.4%	in	
the total economy. In other words, more than one in three 
workers will retire from the labour market over the next 
15 years.50 In addition, the snapshot of new graduates in 
medical and nursing disciplines varies across countries. 
The available data shows that between 2006 and 2016, 
the majority of EU countries experienced an increase in 
the number of new medical doctors, with Latvia, Slovenia 
and Ireland reporting the biggest growth per 100,000 
inhabitants. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Austria 
and Greece reported a decrease, with less new graduates in 
2016 than in 2006.
The age structure of the workforce also 
deserves some attention, as it raises 
concerns about future shortages of health 
and social care professionals and the 
replacement of the workforce.
The picture becomes more concerning when considering 
nursing professionals. The available data suggests 
that the number of new graduates increased in some 
member states (e.g. Croatia, Hungary, Malta), which 
also experienced very high growth rates overall 
between 2008 and 2016. By contrast, many EU countries 
faced decreasing rates for new graduates in nursing 
professions (e.g. Portugal, Romania, Lithuania) which also 
experienced negative growth rates in the same period 
(i.e.	-29.2%,	-50.9%,	-21%	respectively).51 Shortages of 
health professionals might also become exacerbated in 
the coming years as demographic ageing will increase 
the care needs of the European population. Against this 
background, there are growing concerns surrounding the 
workload of care professionals and the consequential 
pressure if the workforce is not replaced appropriately.
The digitalisation of the healthcare sector
Healthcare system digitalisation is a long and complex 
process which has, nevertheless, already started showing 
its concrete applications and the tremendous potential it 
holds for in the near future. 
Health professionals are among those who are most likely 
to have experienced technological developments in their 
workplaces.52 By 2013, basic forms of electronic health 
record (EHR)53 systems were available to an average of over 
90%	of	general	practitioners	across	EU	countries,	and	75%	
of acute care hospitals in Europe reported having some 
form	of	EHRs,	despite	significant	country	variations.54
Health professionals are among  
those who are most likely to have 
experienced technological developments  
in their workplaces.
Advanced functionalities are not yet widespread across 
European hospitals, but when available, they are quite 
popular and regularly used by health professionals in 
their clinical care routines. This is the case, for example, 
for the digital archiving of radiology images, which is only 
available	in	53%	of	European	hospitals	but	used	fully	in	
almost	all	of	them	(92%).	Moreover,	the	electronic	sharing	
of medical information between hospitals and external 
general practitioners and specialists is already occurring 
within the majority of hospital settings in Estonia, 
Denmark, Belgium and Austria.55
Electronic prescribing (e-prescribing) is also increasingly 
developing. Most countries are transitioning from 
paper- to computer-based electronic generation and 
transmission	of	medical	prescriptions.	In	2018,	over	90%	
of prescriptions were electronically transferred from 
prescribers to community pharmacies in Finland, Estonia, 
Sweden, Denmark, Portugal and Spain, while countries 
that have not yet implemented e-prescriptions systems 
(e.g. France, Germany, Ireland, Poland) all committed to 
starting this transition over the next few years.56
Digital	innovation	in	health	is	not	confined	to	the	
generation of EHRs and prescriptions. Despite 
lower adoption levels, more advanced telemedicine 
functionalities, such as the remote domestic monitoring 
of patients homes and remote consultations with patients 
or other health practitioners, are also being implemented.
Furthermore, advanced technologies such as AI, IoT and 
big data analytics are expanding to the healthcare sector, 
bringing about opportunities to advance clinical practice, 
boost medical research and improve system management. 
For instance, the IoT enables smartphones, wearable 
technology and medical equipment to connect to the 
Internet and generate, exchange and analyse health-
related information. AI and machine learning methods 
are increasingly applied in prognosis and outcome 
prediction. Surgical robots and precision medicine 
represent other examples of how technology can be 
applied to healthcare.
The impact of digitalisation on the healthcare workforce
The care sector is set to be among the industries less 
affected by the risk of job loss caused by automation. 
When analysing the susceptibility of jobs to 
computerisation	–	referred	to	as	“job	automation	by	
means of computer-controlled equipment”57 – it would 
seem that most occupations in care are less likely to 
be affected by job automation soon. This is the case for 
physicians and surgeons, nurses, social workers and other 
related jobs. The reason behind this prediction is that 
these occupations are intensive in generalist tasks that 
require social intelligence (e.g. assisting and caring for 
others, social perceptiveness), which are expected to be 
difficult	to	be	substituted	by	computer	capital	over	the	
next decade or two.58
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When analysing the susceptibility of  
jobs to computerisation – referred to  
as “job automation by means of  
computer-controlled equipment” – it 
would seem that most occupations in 
care are less likely to be affected by job 
automation soon.
Conversely, workers employed in health occupations 
are	more	likely	to	experience	changing	skills	profiles.	As	
already highlighted earlier, healthcare professionals are 
among the top occupational groups which experienced 
changes to the technologies being used in the workplace 
(e.g. machinery, ICT systems), and their skill sets are 
expected to become outdated in the near future.59 For 
instance, the deployment of eHealth care technologies 
in homecare (e.g. remote telecare and ambient assisted 
living	[AAL])	requires	professionals	to	develop	a	set	of	
composite	skills	and	technology-specific	competencies	
(e.g.	basic	skills	to	use	new	technology;	specific	skills	
to use the eHealth tool; the ability to interpret, analyse 
and communicate eHealth data).60 Moreover, the 2018 
European Centre for the Development of Vocational 
Training (Cedefop) survey on European skills and jobs 
finds	that	graduates	from	medicine-	and	health-related	
disciplines report the highest initial under-skilling rates 
in	recruitment	among	different	fields	of	study:	over	25%	
of	graduates	in	this	field	report	initial	under-skilling,	
while graduates in disciplines such as mathematics and 
statistics or economics and business report lower rates at 
under	or	around	20%.61
In	addition	to	the	transformative	impact	on	specific	
tasks and the required skills as analysed above, new 
technologies also affect how health services are delivered. 
The implementation of technologically-enhanced health 
services would require adjustments in the organisation of 
healthcare delivery, thus having certain implications on the 
labour force and its working patterns. Research indicates 
that there are areas in which digital health services would 
optimise	human	resources	and	profit	from	efficiency	gains	
(e.g. teleconsultation), therefore reducing the demand 
for more professionals. There are other areas (e.g. remote 
monitoring, AAL technologies, robotic surgery) which 
have the potential of enlarging the market by creating 
new health services and reaching to more patients, and 
therefore demand more workers or even create new 
professional roles.62 Moreover, new delivery models 
permitted by the deployment of new technologies in 
health would require professionals to adjust their working 
patterns. The development of digitally-enabled integrated 
care systems, for example, would require the engagement 
of multidisciplinary teams of health professionals. Also, 
the enhanced coproduction of healthcare – facilitated by 
a	flurry	of	apps	and	personal	mobile	devices	which	enable	
citizens and patients to take on a more active role in 
managing their own health – would require adjustments to 
the daily work life of health professionals.
Lastly,	it	is	important	to	reflect	on	some	of	the	ethical	
implications of technological advances and digital 
solutions in the healthcare sector. When considering the 
potential for an automated healthcare decision-making 
process, AI-driven developments in genome sequencing 
and gene-editing technologies, or the use of robots in 
care settings, a number of ethical and social concerns 
that require careful consideration arise. The use of AI and 
digital technologies poses issues of dehumanised care 
and decreased human contact, which could result in the 
isolation of the patient. Moreover, there is a potential 
lack of accountability for medical decisions if it is taken 
through an automated decision-making process which 
would	translate	into	difficulties	when	seeking	redress	
if	harm	occurs.	These	are	some	examples	of	specific	
concerns regarding the use of new technologies in the 
healthcare sector which might also have an impact on 
how health professionals, patients and citizens at large 
react to the digital transformation of the sector.
Healthcare professionals are among  
the top occupational groups which 
experienced changes to the technologies 
being used in the workplace, and their  
skill sets are expected to become outdated 
in the near future. 
 
The digital transformation of care is unfolding at a 
steady pace, bearing the potential for enormous changes 
in the not-so-distant future. Such changes are already 
impacting the health workforce and pushing healthcare 
systems to adjust to the transformation. As seen above, 
the health and social care workforce is characterised 
by a high share of elderly employment, a prevalence of 
atypical forms of work and great exposure to changing 
skills	profiles.	Moreover,	new	healthcare	graduates	
report the highest initial under-skilling rates at hiring 
and there are growing concerns related to shortages 
of health professionals, especially in comparison to 
the inevitable increase of care needs of the European 
population. These special characteristics will play a 
central role in how the workforce will be impacted 
by new technologies applied in the sector. An old 
workforce lacking digital skills might complicate the 
transformative process, for example. New graduates 
who are under-skilled when entering the labour 
market and in need of further in-work training might 
experience heavy workloads and pressures due to further 
adjustments to digital environments. The very high 
share of health workers engaged in atypical forms of 
employment also raises concerns in terms of access of 
these workers to training and adequate social protection.
The digital transformation of care is 
unfolding at a steady pace, bearing the 
potential for enormous changes in the  
not-so-distant future.
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1.2.2  The media and publishing sector
Although the media and publishing workforce represents 
a small share of the European labour market, this sector 
is at the forefront of technological disruption. The 
early embrace of technologies and the adaptability of 
its business model reveal a tech-savvy industry which 
employs one of the most digitalised workforces.63
The sector is best characterised as an amalgam of  
sub-sectors. It encompasses the production, publication 
and distribution of television, newspapers, magazines, 
books,	film,	radio,	music	as	well	as	other	forms	of	 
audio-visual content.64 In the EU, more than 2 million 
people	work	in	the	industry,	amounting	to	around	1%	 
of the European workforce (see Figure 4).
Between	2009	and	2013,	the	media	and	publishing	sector	
registered	a	significant	decline	of	around	100,000	jobs,	
indicating the sharp effects of the economic recession 
on the industry. However, the sector expanded again 
from	2013	onwards	to	finally	outgrow	the	2009	number.	
As a percentage of the total workforce, the employment 
level	has	remained	relatively	stable	around	the	0.9%	
mark.	However,	when	looking	at	specific	sub-sectors,	the	
illusion of stability fades away. For publishing activities, 
the	number	of	workers	remains	under	2009	levels	with	
a 14,800 decline. The same trend can be observed in 
programming and broadcasting activities, where there 
are	19,000	fewer	employees	compared	to	2009.	The	only	
sector that registered growth is the video, motion picture 
and music production subsectors (see Figure 4).
The educational attainment of this sector is higher than 
that	of	the	average	European	worker.	In	2018,	62%	of	
media and information workers had a tertiary degree 
compared	to	only	35.1%	of	all	EU	workers.	In	terms	of	
gender	differences,	a	significant	disparity	is	visible.	In	
2017,	59.7%	of	all	media	professionals	were	men.	More	
worryingly,	from	2009	to	2018,	a	noticeable	divergence	is	
apparent,	with	a	2.5%	drop	in	the	number	of	women.
Lastly, the age structure of the workforce deserves some 
attention. Media workers are generally younger than the 
overall	labour	force,	with	a	share	of	15-	to	39-year-olds	
representing	47.7%	compared	to	41.8%	of	the	general	
workplace. However, it is worth noting that this difference 
might be readjusted in the future as the media labour 
force appears to be ageing faster. The percentage of the 
mentioned	age	group	amounted	to	55.2%	in	the	media	
sector	in	2009,	compared	to	46.4%	in	the	total	economy.
As regards atypical employment, the available Eurostat 
data does not provide reliable aggregates for the media 
and publishing industry. Thus, the evolution of atypical 
employment cannot be reliably measured for this sector. 
However, through the limited data available, it can be 
inferred that media workers have higher percentages of 
atypical contracts. In this respect, the audio-visual sector 
is a case in point. In 2010, self-employment accounted 
for	21.4%	of	total	employment	compared	with	16.1%	of	
total EU27 employment.65	In	2012,	21%	were	working	
temporarily,	compared	to	12%	of	employees	in	all	
economic sectors.66 Moreover, when studying the  
cultural employment – a broader category which includes 
arts and entertainment activities – it becomes apparent 
that self-employment among workers with a tertiary 
degree	is	much	higher.	In	2017,	more	than	55%	of	the	
highly-educated cultural workforce was self-employed.
The digitalisation of the media sector
In recent history, technology and digitalisation have had 
important implications for the media and publishing 
sector.	These	developments	influenced	distribution	
channels and business model preferences and thereby 
resulted in new emerging challenges for the sector and  
its workforce. 
The consumption of media patterns has changed 
significantly	in	recent	years.	According	to	Statista,	the	EU	
average daily media consumption time in 2017 reached 
a	peak	of	10	hours	and	29	minutes,	a	73-minute	increase	
compared to 2012.68 However, by studying the media 
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source preferences closely, it becomes clear that not all 
channels of consumption enjoyed the same amount of 
growth. Taking the same timeframe as a reference, the use 
of the Internet and social media registered a respective 
13%	and	40%	growth	in	usage.	This	came	at	the	expense	
of more traditional sources (e.g. radio, written press). One 
exception is broadcasting: although it registered a small 
decrease, it is still the principal source of consumption, 
with	94%	of	EU	citizens	consuming	it.69
The digitalisation of media and the 
subsequent shift in consumer preferences 
casts a wide net of issues for the media 
and publishing sector, one of which is 
the decline of traditional media and its 
consequences for business models.
The digitalisation of media and the subsequent shift 
in consumer preferences casts a wide net of issues for 
the media and publishing sector, one of which is the 
decline of traditional media and its consequences for 
business models. Taking newspapers as an example, 
various economic performance indicators reveal declining 
revenues.	Between	2009	and	2017,	the	percentage	of	
household expenditure spent on newspapers and books 
registered	a	-8.3%	decline.70 Furthermore, when studying 
chain-linked	volumes,	defined	as	production	volume	
of newspapers and books expressed in the prices of the 
preceding	year,	a	drop	of	-11%	for	the	same	reference	
period is visible. In parallel, the digitalisation of news, 
coupled with the vast outreach of online platforms, 
enabled data-driven companies to attract more 
advertising revenue.71 
This snapshot reveals that the media industry is 
affected by advances in technologies, digitalisation and 
globalisation in various ways. Some media formats thrive 
while others are being forced to downsize and rethink 
their business model. Regarding both employment levels 
and media consumption preferences, the publishing sub-
sector faces the most radical structural changes, followed 
by the programming and broadcasting subsector. By 
contrast, the video, motion picture and music production 
subsectors are thriving. 
The impact of digitalisation on the media and  
publishing workforce
The rapid and all-encompassing digitalisation of the media 
and	publishing	sector	has	had	deep	ramifications	on	the	
job	market,	the	type	of	work	performed	and	the	profile	of	
the media and publishing worker. In addition to the two 
main sectoral characteristics already highlighted earlier 
(i.e.	a	significant	reduction	in	the	number	of	workers	in	
some sub-sectors of the media industry and increase in the 
employment of atypical workers), digital technologies have 
induced	an	increased	demand	for	flexibility	and	a	wider	
range of skills across all sub-sectors of the industry.72
Due to the emergence of various media technologies 
(e.g. user-friendly video cameras and editing software), 
the demarcation lines between publishing, printing, 
broadcasting and entertainment have blurred in the 
process of multimedia convergence.73 These technologies 
allowed businesses to reduce employment levels by 
combining tasks previously performed by a multitude of 
employees and assigning them to a single worker. This 
has resulted, however, in the work-life balance of media 
workers (barring those in the broadcasting subsector) 
to suffer. From 2008 to 2016, the average yearly working 
hours (expressed as average full-time equivalents) 
increased by 7 hours for workers in the publishing 
subsector and 14 hours for video and audio production 
workers. Digitalisation and the use of big data analytics 
to discover consumer preferences and behaviour has 
resulted in a competitive industry bent on delivering 
fast and unique news and content.74 The pressure to 
accelerate content production may accentuate the trend 
of longer working hours for media workers.
In addition, media workers experience an increasing 
pressure of up- and reskilling. Traditional skills such as 
critical thinking and writing skills are still important 
and will dominate future developments in the industry. 
However, due to digitalisation and the previously 
mentioned multimedia convergence, modern media 
workers perform a wider set of tasks, and practical 
technological skills (e.g. video and audio editing) are 
becoming imperative.
Technological innovation is also shaping the future 
skillset of the media sector. AI is revolutionising 
how	content	is	being	generated,	first	by	changing	
the way research is being conducted, with big data 
analytics and machine learning informing businesses 
and creators about consumer desires ; and second, in 
terms of content production. Many established news 
organisations such as Forbes, The Washington Post, 
and Bloomberg now use AI to generate at least some 
of their content.75 As per example, Heliograf, The 
Washington Post’s AI machine, is used to generate news 
articles about high school American football games 
automatically. According to their director of strategic 
initiatives, the print could only cover a handful of games 
before the arrival of the machine, while now they are 
able to cover its entirety.76 This development means that 
routine tasks will become automated and that the media 
workforce will have to concentrate on highly-skilled 
tasks (e.g. creative writing).
Moreover, the demand for project management skills 
is rising due to a more international and diverse media 
landscape. Management skills are needed to cope 
with increasingly tight deadlines and coordinate work 
on multiple widespread and multicultural platforms. 
However, time pressures and reduced editorial resources 
that accompany the digitalisation of media prompt many 
academics to anticipate a deskilling in fact-checking, 
lateral reading77 and independent research.78
Despite limited data on atypical workers in the industry, 
studies	point	to	significant	challenges	as	regards	the	access	
to upskilling opportunities. For instance, businesses do 
19
not feel incentivised to provide training for journalists 
who often work under a freelance status and for multiple 
companies. Thus, the pressure to upskill and remain 
competitive in the global economy falls predominantly on 
the shoulders of individual workers.79 There are, however, 
good practices of some media companies providing 
training to journalists, especially in France and the UK,80 
and cases in which trade unions and public initiatives 
are taking over the role of businesses in upskilling the 
media workforce. In the Netherlands,81 for instance, public 
broadcasting organisations are organising courses for self-
employed and freelance workers at their own costs; while 
in Italy, unions negotiated company-based agreements, 
which included training. 
The media and publishing sector is one 
of the industries where globalisation, 
digitalisation and advanced technologies 
have revolutionised consumer practices 
and businesses, thus forcing them to 
change their financial models and find new 
ways to generate revenue.
As seen above, the media and publishing sector is one 
of the industries where globalisation, digitalisation and 
advanced technologies have revolutionised consumer 
practices and businesses, thus forcing them to change 
their	financial	models	and	find	new	ways	to	generate	
revenue. The workforce is dominated by young, educated 
workers whose capacity to adapt to these technologies 
is likely to be stronger than the average worker. In the 
same vein, there is some evidence that points to higher 
shares of atypical work arrangements (in particular self-
employment)	compared	to	other	industries.	This	confirms	
the hypothesis that this workforce has a high degree of 
flexibility.	The	changes	induced	by	new	technologies	
in the media and publishing sector are set to continue 
changing the job content of its workforce, including 
raising a number of challenges. Although technology has 
the potential to reduce routine tasks and increase creative 
work, fast-paced media delivery may accentuate the need 
for extremely rapid reactivity and longer working hours, 
thus having repercussions on the workforce’s stress level. 
In addition, while multimedia convergence is increasing 
the need for upskilling, training opportunities remain 
limited for atypical workers.
1.2.3  The transport and logistics sector
Transport and logistics are crucial parts of the European 
economy	with	significant	externalities	in	other	sectors.	
In addition to its strategic importance for the overall 
economy in general and the EU internal market in 
particular,82	this	sector	is	home	to	a	significant	share	of	
the labour force. Almost 12 million people are working 
in	the	sector,	accounting	for	5.3%	of	all	EU	workers.83 
The sheer size of the labour force, combined with the 
low educational attainment of its worker, highlight the 
importance of transport and logistics as a central sector 
for analysing the impact of technological innovation on 
the future of work (see Figure 5).
Taking a long-term view of transport and logistics 
employment, it is clear that the number of workers has 
expanded	in	the	past	decade	by	exceeding	the	2009	level	
with	around	790,000	workers.	On	the	other	hand,	the	
growth level of employment as a percentage of total 
employment has remained modest. 
As regards to the geographical distribution of the 
workforce, a considerable gap between Eastern and 
Western Europe is worth noting. In countries such as 
Estonia, Croatia, Hungary and Lithuania, the proportion 
of transport and logistics workers out of total workers 
exceeded	6.5%	in	2018	(and	even	reached	8.9%	in	Latvia).	
By contrast, Western and Southern European countries 
register	lower	proportions	of	workers,	with	only	4.4%	in	
Portugal	and	3.8%	in	Luxembourg.	From	2009	to	2018,	the	
level of employment has mainly risen in countries where 
the sector was already important. For instance, in the case 
of	Lithuania,	the	sector	grew	by	11.8%.	In	comparison,	
Western European countries have registered negative 
trends, with Luxembourg having the highest negative 
growth	(-18.3%).
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Concerning atypical work, the sector is below the 
European	average,	with	only	31.1%	of	its	workforce	falling	
under non-standard contracts. In the same vein, the levels 
of both temporary and self-employed workers in 2018 
were	below	their	share	in	overall	workforce	(i.e.	10.6%	and	
9.9%	respectively	compared	to	12.1%	and	13.5%).	The	size	
of these two categories has evolved differently over time. 
While the absolute number of temporary workers has 
seen	a	sharp	increase	between	2009	and	2018	(+39.9%),	
the	number	of	self-employed	workers	decreased	(-3.8%).	
In the case of part-time workers, employment levels are 
almost	twice	as	low	as	in	the	general	economy	(10.6%	in	
comparison	to	19.2%),	though	it	did	grow	by	9%	within	
the same referential timeframe (see Figure 6).
Another major development in the transport and logistics 
industry with implications for its workforce is the 
emergence of platform work, which is particularly present 
in the transportation of persons and goods. Although there 
are	no	official	numbers	of	platform	workers	within	the	
sector, other indicators (e.g. vehicle numbers) can illustrate 
the growth of the phenomenon. From 2006 to 2014, the 
number of shared personal vehicles operating on platforms 
(e.g. Uber, Lyft) in Europe expanded more than sevenfold, 
from	7,491	to	57,947.86 More recent data suggests that their 
numbers further increased and that in 2018, the number 
of personal vehicles reached 370,000.87 It is important to 
acknowledge that the growing number of vehicles does not 
correlate with an equal growth in the size of the transport 
and logistics workforce. Most platform workers provide 
services on a casual basis, while maintaining other full- or 
part-time jobs, and not necessarily in the same sector.88 
In terms of educational background, in 2018, the majority 
of transport and logistics workers had completed 
secondary	or	post-secondary	education	(59.2%).	
Meanwhile,	22.5%	had	a	low	educational	background,	
with	only	18.3%	holding	a	tertiary	degree.	This	data	
illustrates the prevalence of middle skilled workers  
in the sector. 
Concerning the gender makeup, we observe a 
considerable	disparity	with	77.9%	of	the	workforce	in	
2018	being	men.	This	gap	has	increased	(+0.4%)	over	the	
last decade. Lastly, the age structure shows that transport 
and logistics workers are on average older than the rest of 
the labour force. In 2018, the proportion of workers over 
the	age	of	50	represented	36%	for	transport	and	logistics	
workers	and	only	33%	of	workers	for	the	general	economy.
The digitalisation of the transport and logistics sector
Historically, this sector has been at the forefront 
of globalisation and technological development. 
Today, many companies like Amazon89 and Uber90 
are spearheading innovation by revolutionising the 
business structure and developing new technologies (e.g. 
autonomous vehicles). However, when studying the whole 
sector, most companies are visibly slow at embracing 
current technological innovation. A series of indicators 
such	as	the	use	of	cloud	computing	services	(14%	of	
transport	and	logistics	companies	compared	to	18%	of	
general	companies	in	2018),	use	of	robots	(3%	compared	
to	7%)	and	employment	of	ICT	specialists	(13%	compared	
to	20%)91 paints a picture of a lagging sector.
The reasons for which transport and logistics are behind 
the curve in relation to overall technological development 
are varied. Some observers point to the combination 
of low labour costs and the high costs of investing in 
and rolling out new technologies. According to their 
argument, the development costs of new technologies 
are high and often has repercussions on the price 
the consumer will pay. Since the transportation and 
logistics sector operates on low margins, the low cost 
of transport labour means that workers are a cheap 
alternative to investing in innovation. Moreover, the lack 
of a regulatory framework for advanced technologies 
slowed down the adoption of said technologies, given 
its high risks, particularly in the realm of human safety 
in transportation activities. The absence of an adapted 
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regulatory framework is also evident in self-driving cars. 
The question of liability in the event of an accident has 
not been solved yet and would necessitate tremendous 
changes in how insurance companies operate.92
Despite such braking factors, the sector might be on 
the cusps of a technological revolution. According to a 
Deloitte study from 2017,93 automation, digitalisation 
and the use of big data are trends that will shape 
the future of transport and logistics. Starting with 
digitalisation, a new abundance of real-time data 
can	put	a	dent	in	inefficient	transport	chains.	The	
development of real-time logistics and the use of 
digital technologies (e.g. cloud analytics) would allow 
to better monitor transport vehicles and create more 
predictable outcomes.94 Similarly, AI can facilitate the 
use of logistics planners and improve the performance 
of logistics operations. Companies such as DHL already 
employ machine learning algorithms to predict delays 
in air transit time and are using this data to enable 
proactive mitigation.95 Furthermore, automation is 
poised	to	disrupt	the	world	of	transport	significantly.	
The development of self-driving vehicles has the 
potential of reducing the need for human labour and 
thus	increase	transport	efficiency.	Besides	reduced	
labour	costs,	automated	cars	increase	efficiency	by	
circumventing labour regulations (e.g. 8-hour driving 
shifts). However, this technology is still far from 
becoming widespread, both from a technological 
perspective (e.g. perfecting driverless software for 
crowded urban situations)96 and in terms of regulatory 
barriers, as mentioned earlier. 
Lastly, the structure of the industry – operating on tight 
deadlines, high volume and low margins – is well suited 
to	benefit	from	the	increased	efficiency	associated	with	
digitalisation.97 In the same vein, some argue that the 
sector’s current increase in labour costs can pressure the 
industry	to	adopt	new	technologies	to	increase	efficiency	
and compensate for lost revenue.98 
The impact of digitalisation on the transport and 
logistics workforce
There is great concern surrounding the magnitude of 
the effects that advanced technologies, especially those 
related to automation, could have on the transport 
and logistics workforce, not least concerning the risks 
of technological unemployment. However, instead 
of	job	loss,	current	evidence	points	to	significant	job	
displacement and polarisation of the sector instead. 
According to a World Maritime University (WMU) study,99 
the potential of automation in the transport sector is 
significant.	For	low-skilled	workers,	the	potential	is	lower	
compared	to	the	rest	of	the	economy	(68%	probability	
of	automation	compared	to	over	80%).	This	might	be	
explained by the importance of the regulatory framework 
and lack of cultural acceptance in certain cases as already 
mentioned. In others, emerging business structures, in 
particular in the area of passenger transportation and 
mobility, still rely on the labour of low skilled workers, 
such as deposit workers.
When studying middle skilled workers, which make up 
the majority of transport and logistics workers, the same 
study	indicates	that	the	risk	of	automation	is	around	77%.	
While up-and reskilling could provide new job prospects 
for these workers, their age also needs to be kept in mind. 
As the transport and logistics worker is generally older 
than the rest of the workforce, there is a risk that  
working	with	advanced	technologies	will	prove	difficult	
and time-intensive. 
The adoption of new technologies in 
this sector could, therefore, accelerate 
tremendously if braking factors such  
as labour cost, regulation and a lack of  
high-tech specialists were to be addressed.
In parallel, studies highlight the increased need for 
high skilled jobs. With a higher degree of technological 
complexity and a low risk of automation (ranging from 
23%	to	30%,	depending	on	the	transport	sub-sector),100 
there will be a higher demand for high skilled jobs (e.g. 
trip planners, transportation coordinators, mobility 
system developers). While increased demand is positive, 
the risk of more acute skills shortage is high. According 
to the WMU as well as a 2017 European Commission 
study,101 low levels of highly skilled workers in the 
transport and logistics sector has already created skills 
shortages in the area of management and logistical 
planning. Furthermore, the lack of people who can 
develop and manage technological innovation is one 
of the factors hampering the further automation of the 
sector. 
The analysis provided in this section indicates that 
transport and logistics represents a large sector, with 
significant	economic	externalities.	Regarding	its	
interaction with technologies, the sector is home to 
some of the most innovative companies which are 
currently testing labour market institutions while 
forcing them to adjust. The rise in temporary workers 
and platform work is one of their direct effects. However, 
this surge of innovation is not distributed equally across 
the sector. Evidence shows that in general, the sector 
is slow in adopting technological innovation, due to a 
variety of reasons. The adoption of new technologies 
in this sector could, therefore, accelerate tremendously 
if braking factors such as labour cost, regulation and a 
lack of high-tech specialists were to be addressed. This 
might, however, also lead to increasing polarisation of 
the sector, thus raising a number of challenges, such as 
the training middle skilled workers. 
1.2.4  The security and defence sector102 
More than any other sector, the security and defence 
sector has long been particularly concerned with 
technological changes due to its historically pioneering 
role in numerous innovations and its importance for the 
safety of the workforce, in particular, the armed forces. 
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The following analysis on the security and defence 
sector is based on the structure and developments of the 
European armed forces, which in 2017 was numbered 
at 1.54 million people,103	thus	amounting	to	0.7%	of	
the overall labour force. These workers are composed 
of	military	(80%	of	the	total	armed	forces)	and	civilian	
personnel.104 The distribution of military and civilian 
personnel has been rather stable in the last decade, 
although there has been a modest increase in the 
proportion of military personnel in more recent years  
(see Figure 7).
Adopting a long-term view of defence and security 
employment as a percentage of total employment, a stark 
decrease	is	visible	between	2005	and	2017	(-0.4%).	In	
absolute	terms,	over	779,000	jobs	have	been	lost	since	
2005 (see Figure 7).
Analysing the characteristics of the structure and 
composition	of	the	European	armed	forces	is	a	difficult	
exercise due to data scarcity and lack of comparative 
data. Thus, it is important to note that the forthcoming 
identification	of	the	major	characteristics	of	the	
European armed forces presented in this section 
faces	some	caveats.	Many	of	the	official	statistics	
(i.e. Eurostat, Cedefop) do not differentiate between 
the armed forces and public sector. Furthermore, it 
is unclear if their methodology of data collection 
allows for comparability. For example, it is unknown 
if the previously mentioned data sources include civil 
personnel in their pool, or only military staff.
Eurostat data indicates that in 2017, most people working 
in the armed forces (15 years of age and older) had 
completed	secondary	or	post-secondary	education	(48%).	
34%	obtained	a	degree	in	tertiary	education,	whereas	
18%	had	only	completed	their	primary	education.	This	
highlights a medium skilled workforce, with only low 
percentages of low skilled workers. Variations might exist 
across the member states, however. 
The gender makeup also reveals severe disparities: 
the proportion of women in the armed forces varies 
drastically from one country to another. In 2015, women 
made	up	15.5%	of	the	French	military	workforce	and	
37.7%	of	the	civilian	personnel.105 In 2018, women made 
up	12.1%	of	the	German	armed	forces,	a	drastic	increase	
from	1.4%	in	2000.106 The gender disparity is similar 
among military tertiary students. In the majority of 
EU	countries,	women	represented	less	than	20%	of	the	
graduates of 2016. The highest share of female graduates 
was	registered	in	Poland	(42%).
As regards the age structure of the defence and security 
workforce, a prevailing young demographic is worth 
noting. Based on data provided by the European 
Organisation of Military Associations and Trade Unions 
(EUROMIL),107 the largest age group in countries such 
as the Netherlands or Denmark are workers between 20 
and 30. Furthermore, many countries impose age limits 
for active service, thus limiting the age distribution of 
military personnel.108 However, in the case of civilian 
personnel, there is evidence that the majority of the 
workforce	belongs	to	the	40	and	older	age	group:	61.9%	of	
the UK’s workforce apply, while in 2018 the average age of 
French civilian personnel was just 47.109  
There is no publicly available data detailing the spread 
of atypical working arrangements in the defence and 
security sector. However, questionnaire data provided 
by EUROMIL reveals that in two of its eight member 
organisations (i.e. Hungary, Greece), short-term 
contracts are the only available contract arrangement 
for	enlisted	personnel.	In	five	member	organisations	 
(i.e. Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Slovakia, Cyprus), both 
short- and long-term contracts are available, and only  
in one (i.e. Ireland) is long-term contracts the norm. 
Finally, it is important to highlight other peculiarities 
faced by the armed forces. Military personnel is 
governed by different employment laws across the  
EU and not all workers’ rights are guaranteed 
everywhere (e.g. Irish defence workers do not have  
the right to unionise).111 
The digitalisation of the security and defence sector
Technology and digitalisation have a rooted history in 
the defence sector. In fact, many civilian technologies, 
such as the Global Positioning System (GPS) and 
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the	Internet,	were	first	developed	for	military	use.112 
Nowadays, many of the technologies which will 
revolutionise the industry are coming from the private 
sector. Their impact will be concentrated in three 
important areas: enhancing connectivity, enhancing 
understanding and enhancing equipment.113
Several important technological developments such 
as blockchain, IoT and virtual reality will innovate 
defence connectivity. As per example, the IoT, which 
interconnects non-smart machines by enabling them 
to send and receive data, has the potential to reduce 
the information dissonance between troops on the 
ground and the control centre. This new abundance of 
data coupled with the graphical display power of virtual 
reality can reduce the need for logistical coordination 
and thereby reduce costs. In tandem, this increases the 
accuracy of decision-making and the safety of people on 
the ground.114
Another important development is the use of AI-related 
technologies. Understanding risks and opportunities is 
vital in the military environment. Recent developments 
in technology and data analysis have the potential to 
increase the predictability of decision-making and 
the overall security of operations. Accordingly, these 
new technologies will require an increase in civilian 
personnel, who can detect patterns and provide  
real-time analysis to military staff who take decisions  
on the ground.
In terms of equipment, automation and robots can 
replace humans in performing dangerous tasks, augment 
human capability through sensors or help with manual 
tasks. Drones are already being deployed in situations 
where the risk is deemed too high for airplane pilots. 
These can be used to deliver equipment, surveil enemy 
bases115 or even provide targeted strikes. Robots and 
machines that enhance human physical potential can 
also be deployed to assist the armed forces. Finally, 
equipment	would	benefit	from	the	development	of	3D	
printing which could reduce the costs associated with 
the production of tools and parts, enhance their design 
and streamline the time it takes to reach the end-user.116 
The impact of digitalisation of the security and  
defence workforce 
The previous section had shown how advanced 
technologies	can	bring	in	more	efficiency,	reduce	
costs, and improve decision-making as well as the 
understanding of risks. At the same time, they will alter 
the nature of armed forces’ jobs, thus raising a number of 
new opportunities and challenges.  
Among the positive effects of technological adoption, it 
is worth noting how the introduction of robotics could 
create new opportunities for female workers in the armed 
forces, thus reducing the gender gap. The physical burden 
of military work could diminish thanks to new equipment, 
such as robotic exoskeleton which transfer the physical 
burden from muscles to the machine.117 Another positive 
effect is the increase in military workers’ safety that new 
technologies could bring about. Take the example of 
operators	flying	out	military	drones	into	high-risk	combat	
areas from a safe distance.
On a more pessimistic note, advanced technologies 
might also create new sources of tension for the armed 
forces, which might become subject to new types of risks. 
The increase in the amount of data used to aid decision 
making will only add a new layer of complexity to which 
humans will have to adapt. New ethical implications with 
respect to decision-making and diffusion of responsibility 
will emerge as a result of technological progress. 
Furthermore, there are fears regarding the overreliance 
on technologies and the risk it poses on human lives. 
Since armed forces operate in hostile and unpredictable 
scenarios, technological failure could lead to irreversible 
consequence. In such situations, the personnel needs to 
be able to operate without the aid of machines and big 
data.
In addition, as in the other sectors, technological changes 
are likely to greatly disrupt the workforce. When looking at 
defence investment expenditure (i.e. R&D and equipment 
procurement), one can see that the level of expenditure 
per military personnel increases due to the combine effect 
of higher investment and a reduced number of employees. 
As seen in Figure 8, this trend was present in 15 (marked 
in red in Figure 8) out of 24 countries. Concerning the 
remaining countries, there is a variety of scenarios. Two 
countries (blue) combine rising investment per military 
personnel	and	an	increase	in	staff;	five	countries	(black)	
witness a decrease in both investment and the number of 
military personnel; and two other countries (green) see 
a growing number of military personnel despite lower 
investment per staff.118	Interestingly,	these	figures	could	
suggest that while technological changes reduce the 
demand for certain jobs, higher investment per personnel 
reflect	more	costly	and	sophisticated	equipment	and	
therefore a need for highly skilled workers.
The previous argument is also highlighted by data 
on educational attainment: since 2011 to 2017, the 
percentage of tertiary educated workers in the armed 
forces	increased	from	30%	to	34%,	while	the	percentage	of	
low	skilled	workers	decreased	from	21%	to	18%.	Given	the	
increased complexity associated with new technologies, 
this trend will most probably be accelerated.
Even with rising personnel investment, several research 
studies120 raised the issue of existing skill mismatches in 
the sector. At the moment, as well as in the immediate 
future, technical skills make up the majority of the skills 
deficit	(e.g.	electrical	engineering,	software	engineer,	
AI specialist). However, in the not-so-distant future, 
studies suggest a growing gap between the demand 
and supply of cognitive skills, such as management and 
leadership. Such skill shortage is particularly worrying 
in the case of the security and defence sector where the 
need to embrace advanced technologies goes beyond 
the question of economic competitiveness and can 
have a direct impact on human lives. Thus, gaining in 
technological autonomy and protecting the lives of our 
soldiers	do	require	having	a	sufficient	level	of	high-tech	
specialists which can develop, update and maintain new 
technologies. In addition, this skill mismatch projection 
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is illustrative of the dual impact new technologies will 
have on the labour market. Although technological 
innovation increases the demand for technical know-how, 
technologies also change how people work and interact 
with machines, which in turn increases the demand for 
social and cognitive skills.
Re-establishing a certain form of 
technological autonomy is essential for 
the sector. It demands stronger efforts to 
recruit and retain high-tech specialists, 
implying the need for attractive and 
competitive contractual arrangements.
As seen above, the size of the European armed forces is 
greatly declining, while the investment per personnel 
is generally expanding suggesting a growing need 
for more skilled workers. While the ongoing job 
displacement appears to be one of the consequences of 
technological development, the sector has lost ground 
in its capacity to instigate technological breakthroughs. 
This could have serious consequences, especially as 
regards the human lives of its armed forces, which 
operate	on	the	battle	field.	Re-establishing	a	certain	
form of technological autonomy is therefore essential 
for the sector. It demands stronger efforts to recruit 
and retain high-tech specialists, implying the need for 
attractive and competitive contractual arrangements. 
In parallel, the adoption of new technologies could 
lead	to	additional	benefits	such	as	a	greater	gender	
balance. It could also, however, raise new needs and 
risks that will require enhanced levels of coordination 
across the armed forces, training oriented towards new 
technologies, and stress-related programmes.
1.3  INTERIM CONCLUSIONS
The	analysis	provided	in	the	first	chapter	of	this	paper	
indicates that labour market transformations feature 
some	mega-trends	and	sectoral	specificities	at	the	same	
time. While new technologies will instigate some job 
loss in certain industries, job displacement and labour 
market polarisation (i.e. shifting jobs towards the high 
and low ends of the skill spectrum and away from the 
middle), are set to be some of the main characteristics 
of tomorrow’s labour market. The intensity of this 
polarisation for each industry already varies – and will 
continue doing so – according to a number of factors, 
such as the regulatory environment, labour cost, the 
structure of the workforce within each industry, workers’ 
involvement, the degree of globalisation and tasks 
fragmentation within the sector, public acceptance of 
machines and robots, as well as their implications. 
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The uptake of new technologies across sectors indicates 
that some industries were faster in interacting with 
digital innovations than others. For instance, the media 
and publishing industry embraced digitalisation at 
an early stage – which was made possible thanks to a 
young,	educated	and	flexible	workforce	–	and	which	
had major consequences on the development of new 
business models. The pace of the transformations and 
the corresponding challenges will therefore vary across 
sectors, thus requiring different solutions. 
While new technologies will instigate 
some job loss in certain industries, 
job displacement and labour market 
polarisation (i.e. shifting jobs towards the 
high and low ends of the skill spectrum 
and away from the middle), are set to 
be some of the main characteristics of 
tomorrow’s labour market.
Furthermore, this chapter has shown that European 
labour	markets	witness	an	increased	diversification	and	
mix of work arrangements following different patterns 
across countries, between and within sectors and having 
serious implications for the workforce. Atypical work 
arrangements already pre-existed the recent and massive 
spread of the digitalisation of the economy and increased 
in the context of the economic crisis. Their development 
(sometimes fostered by new technologies but not always) 
is now intensifying, thus creating ever more complex 
labour markets and career trajectories.
The combination of these two developments – labour 
market	polarisation	and	the	diversification	of	work	
arrangements – give rise to a new techno-economic 
paradigm.
Therefore, the mega-trends at work as well as the sectoral 
specificities	highlighted	in	this	chapter	point	to	both	the	
need for an overall strategy towards the future of work and 
a general understanding of its resulting transformations,  
as well as a set of sectoral approaches that should offer 
tailor-made	answers	to	specific	challenges.
Finally, and despite industrial characteristics, some 
considerations hold true for all sectors. First and foremost, 
at	a	time	of	fierce	global	competition,	one	of	the	key	drivers	
of technological development and competitiveness will be 
the ability of each industry to attract and retain high-tech 
specialists while ensuring a high degree of digital literacy 
across	the	workforce.	In	addition,	the	diversification	of	
work arrangements raises fundamental questions as 
regards working structures and organisational patterns 
that have, for instance, direct implications on how training 
is organised and delivered to workers.
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Chapter 2: Atypical workers – A new precariat?
As previously mentioned, the world of work is being 
transformed by a number of major forces leading to a 
mix	and	diversification	of	work	arrangements.	While	
permanent full-time contracts remain the norm, 
part-time and temporary forms of employment have 
increased and new forms of work such as platform 
work have emerged. This chapter aims to identify the 
central characteristics of atypical workers by paying 
particular attention to the consequences of their work 
arrangements for their rights, not least those falling 
under the realm of working conditions and access 
to social protection. It raises the heated question of 
whether atypical workers represent the new precariat of  
21st century labour markets. Divided into two sections, it 
attempts to answer this question by (2.1) understanding 
the	profiles	of	atypical	workers	by	studying	the	
sectors they work in, their age, level of education and 
gender; and (2.2) examining atypical workers’ working 
conditions and social protection coverage.
2.1  ATYPICAL WORKERS – WHO ARE THEY?
 To analyse the impact of digitalisation on working 
patterns and build an appropriate public policy  
response for atypical workers, it is imperative to go 
beyond	aggregate	figures	and	better	understand	what	
their main characteristics are.
2.1.1  Where do they work?
As shown through the sectoral approach applied in 
Chapter 1, the prevalence of new working arrangements 
and the distribution of workers across the different 
categories of atypical employment vary across 
industries.	This	section	complements	the	findings	
of Chapter 1 by providing a comparative overview of 
the general distribution of employment in the overall 
economy and the size of atypical work in the main 
sectors shaping the European economy.
Figure	9	shows	the	sectoral	composition	of	the	economy	
and the corresponding distribution of employment. 
Nearly half of all employment is concentrated in public 
services and in the wholesale and retail economy 
(49.5%),	while	the	rest	is	dispersed	mainly	in	industry,	
construction,	professional	and	scientific	activities	as	well	
as the arts, entertainment and activities of household.
Atypical work is more prevalent in some sectors of the 
economy than others. By means of comparison, Figure 10 
shows the distribution of economic sectors by working 
arrangements. For temporary employment, we observe 
similar trends to the ones shaping the overall economy. 
The majority of temporary workers are concentrated in 
public services and in the wholesale and retail economy 
(53.4%).	
For part-time employment, too, these sectors hire the 
majority	of	part-time	workers	(60.4%).	However,	there	
are	some	disrepancies.	On	one	hand,	9.8%	of	part-time	
workers are employed in the arts, entertainment and 
activities of household, while the sector only makes 
up	5.3%	of	overall	employment.	On	the	other	hand,	we	
observe that there is a much lower presence of part-time 
workers	in	industry	(i.e.	6.3%	compared	to	17.4%).
When considering self-employment, we note a higher 
presence	in	agriculture	(13.7%	compared	to	3.7%),	
professional	and	scientific	activities	(16.2%	compared	to	
9.8%)	and	construction	(13.1%	compared	to	6.8%).	The	
public services and the wholesale and retail economy 
make	up	only	33.8%	of	the	self-employed	workforce.	This	
is mainly due to the low presence of such contractual 
arrangements	in	public	services	(i.e.	9.6%	compared	to	
25.5%	in	the	general	economy).
Taken	together,	this	data	provides	interesting	findings	
about the employment composition of certain sectors. 
Some of them are mainly composed of atypical 
employment. This is the case in the areas of agriculture, 
the arts, entertainment and activities of household, where 
over	70%	of	the	workforce	falls	under	atypical	employment.	
To a lesser extent, but still deviating from the norm, 
professional	and	scientific	occupations	are	also	dominated	
by	atypical	contracts	(56%).	By	contrast,	the	sectors	which	
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are	the	least	affected	by	atypical	work	are	industry	(23%),	
financial	and	insurance	activities	(29%)	and	ICT	(35%).
Turning	our	attention	to	platform	work,	the	findings	of	
the COLLEEM survey indicate that the most common 
type of work provided through platforms is online 
clerical	and	data	entry	(43%),	followed	by	professional	
and	creative	tasks	(both	above	30%)	with	a	sizeable	
minority providing transport and on-location handy 
work	(around	15%).	Based	on	these	tasks,	we	can	infer	
that platform workers are most active in wholesale 
and retail, ICT, as well as the arts, entertainment and 
activities of household. 
Platform work, by definition, is mediated 
through digital technologies, and as a 
result we observe higher percentages in 
sectors that were already deeply impacted 
by digitalisation and new technologies.
A closer look at the sectors in which atypical and platform 
workers operate reveals important differences between 
the	two	phenomena.	Platform	work,	by	definition,	is	
mediated through digital technologies, and as a result we 
observe higher percentages in sectors that were already 
deeply impacted by digitalisation and new technologies 
(e.g. ICT), and a minority of workers in sectors with 
lower levels of digitalisation (e.g. transportation). In 
comparison, the distribution of other forms of atypical 
work	is	more	diverse	and	influenced	by	a	multitude	of	
factors, including but not limited to digitalisation. An 
example is the percentage of atypical workers in the 
ICT sector. Even though the sector is at the forefront of 
digitalisation and technological change, the number of 
atypical workers has actually been decreasing.
2.1.2 What is their age?
In terms of age structure, data reveals important 
differences between atypical workers and the rest of the 
active population. As seen in Figure 11 (page 28), the 
majority of the labour force is composed of the 25-54 
age	group,	which	is	experiencing	a	decline	to	the	benefit	
of	the	55-64	group.	The	latter	has	grown	from	12%	to	
17%	between	2008	and	2018.
On average, self-employed workers are older. While 
they are primarily made up of the 25-54 age group, the 
percentage of 55 to 64-year-old workers is higher  
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(22%	compared	to	17%),	as	well	as	the	65+	age	group	(8%	
compared	to	3%).	There	is	little	variation	between	the	
total self-employed population and own-account workers, 
with the latter being slightly older. Over the last decade, 
both categories have experienced demographic ageing.
Temporary workers are much younger. In 2018,  
15	to	24-year-old	workers	made	up	28%	of	temporary	
employment	compared	to	8%	of	total	employment.	
They	have,	however,	declined	by	five	percentage	points	
between	2008	and	2018,	to	the	benefit	of	the	55-64	age	
group. Here, we observe a stark contrast between total 
temporary workers and involuntary ones, with the latter 
being older. This is mainly caused by the number of young 
workers voluntarily seeking short-term employment 
during their studies.
Part-time workers are mostly made up of the 25-54 age 
group, though it is witnessing a declining trend to the 
benefit	of	the	55-64	group.	The	latter	group	grew	from	
15%	to	19%	between	2008	and	2018.	Compared	to	the	
total part-time workers, involuntary part-timers are 
younger. In 2018, the percentage of 25 to 54-year-old 
workers is higher by nine points, while the percentage of 
15 to 24-year olds is unchanged. 
Finally, and with respect to platform workers, the 
COLLEEM survey shows that platform workers are on 
average 10 years younger than the average employee (34 
compared to 44).124 Figure 12 shows the age distribution 
of	offline	workers	(total	employment)	as	well	as	the	
distribution of platform workers by intensity of platform 
work.	The	first	category	represents	workers	who	do	not	
spend	a	significant	amount	of	time	on	platforms	(10	
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hours per week), the second represents workers who 
spend	a	significant	time	on	platforms	but	for	whom	
platform work does not represent their main source of 
income, with the last representing workers who earn 
more	than	50%	of	their	income	through	platform	work.	
A careful comparison reveals that with the increase in 
platform work intensity, the age distribution is being 
skewed towards the younger age groups.
Based on the data presented earlier, we conclude that 
the 25-54 age group is the most numerous for all types 
of	work.	However,	their	percentage	varies	significantly	
between different forms of atypical work, ranging 
from	61%	for	part-time	workers	to	75%	for	involuntary	
temporary workers. Younger workers were most 
widespread in temporary employment and in platform 
work,	while	the	percentage	of	65+	year	old	workers	was	
highest among the self-employed. For all employment 
types, however, the demographic distribution shifted 
towards older workers between 2008 and 2018. 
2.1.3 What is their educational attainment?126 
The European labour force is dominated by medium 
skilled workers, as seen in Figure 13 (page 30). However, 
when looking at the past 10 years from 2008 to 2018, we 
observe a gradual decrease in the numbers of medium 
skilled	workers	from	49.3%	to	47.4%,	to	the	benefit	of	high	
skilled ones, who increased by eight percentage points in 
the same reference period. 
Similarly, self-employed workers are primarily medium 
skilled	(43.6%	in	2018).	However,	we	observe	over	the	last	
decade a drastic change in the share of high skilled self-
employed	people,	who	increased	from	24.5%	to	34.2%,	
mainly at the expense of the low skilled ones. There is 
little variation between total self-employed and own-
account workers. 
In the case of temporary workers, the distribution of 
skills is also skewed towards medium skills, with a 
higher percentage of low skilled workers. Uniquely 
among different types of employment, we observe the 
percentages of low skilled and high skilled workers to 
be	roughly	equal	(26%	compared	to	28.8%).	From	2008	
to 2018, the number of low skilled workers declined, 
mostly in favour of high skilled ones, while the number 
of medium skilled workers changed marginally. However, 
from 2014, we observe a slightly increasing trend in 
favour of low skilled workers. For involuntary temporary 
workers, the increase was even higher, accentuated by the 
more drastic decline in medium skilled workers.
Part-time employment is also mostly composed of 
medium skilled workers. Moreover, in a similar trend, 
the percentage of high skilled workers increased from 
22.3%	to	29.6%	between	2008	and	2018,	at	the	expense	
of the low and medium skilled labour force. However, 
unlike other types of atypical employment, there are 
stark differences between total part-time workers and 
involuntary ones. Uniquely, the number of low skilled 
involuntary part timers is higher than that of high 
skilled	workers;	31.9%	compared	to	22.7%	in	2018.
Lastly, according to the COLLEEM survey,128 platform 
workers tend to be more educated than the general 
workforce.	The	survey	estimated	that	in	2017,	around	55%	
of	workers	who	earn	more	than	50%	of	their	income	from	
platform work had a tertiary degree. As shown previously, 
although there are some platform workers who perform 
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low skilled tasks, the majority of them work in digital- and 
numerical-intensive	fields,	which	require	higher	levels	of	
educational attainment. Interestingly, Figure 14 indicates 
that the educational attainment is positively correlated 
with the intensity of platform work. However, as shown 
in Annex 1, the majority of platforms require low to 
medium skills, meaning that the platform workforce is 
overqualified	for	the	jobs.		
As shown above, the majority of workers, with the notable 
exception of platform workers, have medium skills. For 
the past decade, for all categories, there has been a drastic 
increase in the number of high skilled workers, who have 
replaced, in almost all cases, low skilled workers as the 
second-most numerous in the workforce. In the case of 
platform workers, we observe a high share of high skilled 
workers, due to the knowledge-intensive industries in 
which they operate.
2.1.4 What is their gender?
In terms of gender differences, the total workforce 
consists	of	54%	males	and	46%	females,	with	these	
numbers staying relatively constant over the last decade, 
despite a trend of slight convergence. Moving beyond 
aggregate	figures,	it	is	worth	noting	that	women	are	
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more	educated,	with	39.2%	of	them	having	completed	a	
tertiary	education,	compared	to	31.5%	of	men.	Moreover,	
while the share of high skilled workers increased for 
both categories from 2008 to 2018, it increased more for 
women	(9.7	percentage	points	compared	to	7).
From a gender perspective, there are signs 
of convergence for all categories of work. 
However, when looking at education, 
women make up a higher proportion of 
high skilled workers, with an accelerating 
trend between 2008 and 2018.
When considering self-employment, the gender gap 
is	more	pronounced;	66%	of	workers	are	men	and	
34%	women.	Since	2008,	there	has	been	little	to	no	
convergence on this front. When studying skill levels, 
in line with the trend displayed at the total workforce 
level, self-employed women are more educated with 
39.4%	having	completed	tertiary	education,	compared	
to	31.4%	of	men.	The	difference	is	even	higher	when	
looking	at	own-account	workers,	where	42.9%	of	women	
have	tertiary	degrees	compared	to	29.4%	of	men.	Here	
too, data from 2008 to 2018 shows the increase in high 
skilled workers, with a more rapid increase of female 
workers	(+14.1	percentage	points	for	women	and	+7.4	
for	men),	and	own-account	workers	(+14.5	percentage	
points	and	+7.9	for	men).
For temporary workers, both voluntary and involuntary, 
the gender distribution is roughly equal and has been 
stable over the last decade. When considering educational 
background, the differences are considerable. Women 
tend	to	have	higher	education:	34.1%	and	36.2%	for	
involuntary	temporary	workers,	with	+11.4	and	+14.7	
percentage points difference compared to men. When 
looking at the evolution from 2008 to 2018 for both 
voluntary and involuntary temporary workers, the share 
of high skilled workers increased for both genders  
(+6.5	and	+7.6	percentage	points	for	women,	compared	 
to	+4.2	and	3.8	percentage	points	for	men).
A substantial gender divide appears in the case of part-
time	workers.	In	2018,	73.5%	of	all	part-time	workers	
were	women	while	only	26.5%	were	men.	In	the	case	
of involuntary part time, the gender divide is slightly 
lower,	with	67.6%	of	involuntary	part-time	workers	being	
women	and	32.4%	being	men.	In	both	cases,	there	has	
been a slight gender convergence over the past decade, 
with the percentage of women workers dropping by 
2.8 and 4.4 percentage points respectively. The gender 
difference in the share of highly educated part-time 
workers is less pronounced than in other types of 
atypical	work.	When	considering	skill	composition,	30%	
of	women	have	tertiary	education	compared	to	28.6%	of	
men	working	part	time	voluntarily,	and	23.7%	of	women	
compared	to	20.7%	of	men	working	in	involuntary	 
part-time employment.
When looking at the gender distribution of platform work, 
the COLLEEM survey reveals that the representation 
of women progressively decreases as the intensity of 
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platform	work	increases.	More	specifically,	in	comparison	
to	the	wider	economy,	women	represent	40%	of	workers	
who	perform	non-significant	platform	work,	and	31%	of	
those	who	perform	significant	work	on	platforms	without	
this being their main form of income. Conversely, women 
account	for	only	26%	of	workers	whose	primary	form	of	
employment is platform work.130
Therefore, from a gender perspective, there are signs 
of convergence for all categories of work. However, 
when looking at education, women make up a higher 
proportion of high skilled workers, with an accelerating 
trend between 2008 and 2018. 
2.2  ATYPICAL WORKERS’ WORKING 
CONDITIONS AND SOCIAL PROTECTION
Atypical employment, not least platform work, is often 
associated in the public debate with precariousness, 
although it is important to recall that the two phenomena 
are not necessarily synonymous. To avoid simplifying 
the complex realities of the world of work, international 
organisations do therefore prefer to call for an agenda 
on ‘decent work for all’, regardless of the type of work 
arrangements, standard or non-standard, a person is 
taking part in. As highlighted in Infobox 4 (page 32), 
precarious employment and decent work have varying 
definitions.	In	an	attempt	to	answer	the	question	whether	
atypical workers represent the new precariat of the 21st 
century, this section will investigate atypical workers’ 
remuneration, working hours, access to social protection 
and trade union representation, taking into account the 
different nuances and complexities mentioned above.
2.2.1 The remuneration of atypical workers
There are little comparable data about the remuneration of 
atypical workers. Alternatively, it is interesting to examine 
the extent of in-work at risk of poverty,131 which is a growing 
phenomenon within the entire workforce. Between 2010 and 
2018, the percentage of workers at risk of poverty increased 
by	0.6	percentage	points	from	5.2%	to	5.8%.	Despite	the	
general increase of the issue, considerable differences 
appear between those working under atypical contracts and 
those engaged in traditional employment. Data indicates 
that atypical workers were more likely to be below the 
poverty line in 2017 than those in traditional employment. 
In	fact,	16.2%	of	temporary	workers	and	15.6%	of	part-time	
workers were at risk of poverty.
Additionally, a long-term analysis of in-work poverty 
highlights that the number of working poor among atypical 
workers has increased more rapidly than among people 
being in a traditional employment relationship. In the 
case of temporary workers, the percentage of workers who 
experience	poverty	grew	from	13.3%	to	16.2%	between	
2010 and 2017. In the case of part-time workers, between 
2010	and	2017,	in-work	poverty	grew	from	12.9%	to	15.6%.
A long-term analysis of in-work poverty 
highlights that the number of working 
poor among atypical workers has increased 
more rapidly than among people being in a 
traditional employment relationship.
Relevant cross-country variations exist, with Eastern 
Europe having more working poor, in both typical and 
atypical contracts, and Northern Europe having fewer. 
When looking at the differences between typical and 
atypical contracts, some interesting trends emerge, in 
particular in Eastern and Southern Europe. For example, 
in Latvia, there is a difference of 17 percentage points 
between	full-	and	part-time	employment	(7.4%	and	24.4%	
respectively), and almost 23 points between temporary 
and	permanent	employment	(6.7%	and	29.5%).	Some	
exceptions, however, are worth noting. The Czech 
Republic, for instance, has a difference of only  
4.8 percentage points for part-time/full-time work and  
4.6 for temporary/permanent employment. Northern 
Europe registers the lowest differences. For example, 
Finland has a 5.2 points difference between part-time/
full-time work and a 4.1 points difference for temporary/
permanent employment. 
In-work poverty appears to be a more 
widespread phenomenon among atypical 
workers, although important variations 
exist across countries.
INFOBOX 4. From precarious employment to  
decent work
According to the ILO, some common characteristics of 
‘precarious employment’ can be identified despite the 
multifaceted and often context-specific aspects of the 
phenomenon. The concept of precariousness entails elements 
such as instability, lack of protection, and vulnerability. Thus, 
‘precarious employment’ is “typically understood as work that 
is low paid, especially if associated with earnings that are at or 
below the poverty level and variable; insecure, meaning that 
there is uncertainty regarding the continuity of employment and 
the risk of job loss is high; with minimal worker control, such 
that the worker, either individually or collectively, has no say 
about their working conditions, wages or the pace of work; and 
unprotected, meaning that the work is not protected by law or 
collective agreements with respect to occupational safety and 
health, social protection, discrimination or other rights normally 
provided to workers in an employment relationship.”132 
As regards the concept of decent work, it entails major elements 
(e.g. dignity, equality, fair income, safe working conditions). It 
has been recognised as a universal objective to be achieved in 
the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. According 
to the ILO, decent work “involves opportunities for work that is 
productive and delivers a fair income, security in the workplace 
and social protection for families, better prospects for personal 
development and social integration, freedom for people to 
express their concerns, organize and participate in the decisions 
that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment 
for all women and men.”133 To pursue these objectives, the ILO 
has developed the Decent Work Agenda, an approach for the 
community of work based on four strategic pillars: 1) rights at 
work; 2) full and productive employment; 3) enhanced social 
protection; and 4) improved social dialogue.
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Due to the complexity of the phenomenon, it is harder 
to report on the income of platform workers.134 Most of 
them	(68.1%)	report	having	employee	status,	7.6%	are	
self-employed, while the rest are either unemployed, in 
training, retired or ‘homemakers’. As previously mentioned, 
only a small percentage relies on platform work for most of 
their income. 
However, interviews with platform workers reveal that 
platform-based	earnings	are	insufficient	to	make	a	decent	
living.135 This may vary depending on numerous factors: 
status, type of task (with on-location activities bringing 
more income), and country (with on-location platform 
workers in Austria, for example, earning more than the 
average national wage for low skilled work). Their pay 
is	also	influenced	by	working	time.	In	some	countries,	
platforms	offer	significantly	more	money	for	weekend	
work. In France, a platform worker may have an incentive 
of €4 per hour incentive to work on weekends, depending 
on the type of contract. However, this raises concerns about 
working time and work intensity.
Based on the data presented above, in-work poverty 
appears to be a more widespread phenomenon among 
atypical workers, although important variations exist 
across countries. In addition, some countries have 
managed to maintain low differences between standard 
and non-standard workers, thus showing that public 
policies	matter	to	create	a	level	playing	field	among	the	
diverse types of employment statuses. 
2.2.2 Working hours
In 2018, full-time employees worked on average  
41.2 hours per week across the EU. Compared to 2008, 
this	figure	denotes	a	slight	reduction	of	0.6	hour.	This	
trend does not display strong country variations.
The trend is, however, reversed when it comes to  
part-time work. The EU average was 20.5 hours in 2018, 
showing an increase since 2008 when the average time 
was	19.9	hours.	Looking	at	the	geographical	patterns,	
both Central and Eastern European countries as well as 
Nordic states saw a decrease in part-time working hours, 
while the biggest increase was registered in Western and 
Southern states, with Belgium registering the biggest 
increase from 23.6 hours to 25.3.
For the self-employed, working time is slightly higher 
than for typical workers. On average, they work 42.1 hours 
(i.e.	0.9	hours	more	than	full-time	employed	persons).	
However, when looking at own-account workers, their 
working-hours are lower than those of typical employees, 
reaching	an	average	of	39.6	hours.	Furthermore,	it	is	
worth mentioning that the decrease in working hours 
between 2008 and 2018 is more pronounced than for full-
time employees. In fact, the decrease was by 2.2 hours 
for all self-employed and 2.3 hours in the case of own-
account workers. 
Temporary workers, on average, work less than typical 
workers.	In	2018,	they	worked	32.6	hours,	i.e.	9.2	hours	
less than standard employees. Moreover, as in the case of 
the self-employed, there has been a decrease in working 
time,	0.9	hours	less	since	2010.
For platform workers, the diversity of the phenomenon 
renders	any	generalisation	difficult.	However,	data	shows	
that	50%	of	all	platform	workers	work	less	than	10	hours	
a week.136 
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The evidence provided above and other data presented in 
the	Issue	Paper	point	to	significant	trends	in	the	structure	
of the labour market. There has been a structural shift 
towards part-time work, which increased in both the 
number of workers and the number of hours worked. 
However, when considering both working time and income, 
it is worrying to see that although part-time workers spend 
more time working, more of them are at risk of poverty. 
For other types of atypical work, the picture is less clear. In 
the case of self-employment, both the number of workers 
(except for own-account workers) and their working hours 
declined, while there was an increase in temporary workers 
but a decline in their working time. 
2.2.3 Social protection legislation and statutory gaps
The growing decoupling of employment from social 
protection and the resulting low coverage of a growing 
number of workers lie at the core of the negative 
public perception of certain new forms of contractual 
arrangements.137 Before looking at the social protection 
associated with different types of job status, however, 
it is important to highlight a few caveats. Achieving a 
comprehensive	and	comparative	overview	in	this	field	is	
difficult	due	to	the	high	heterogeneity	of	social	protection	
systems across member states. Furthermore, the distinction 
between statutory (i.e. permitted or required by law) and 
effective coverage (i.e. the social protection provisions 
that	workers	benefit	from	in	reality)	adds	another	layer	
of complexity to the equation. While dealing with these 
caveats, it appears that the most comprehensive study is 
a 2017 Commission paper that analyses national policies 
with data from the Mutual Information System on Social 
Protection (MISSOC) database, and builds a taxonomy 
of statutory social protection access.138 The section below 
sheds light on existing social protection legislation and 
statutory gaps for the different categories of non-standard 
forms of employment. 
As regards self-employed workers, a great degree 
of heterogeneity becomes apparent. The previously 
mentioned Commission study establishes four clusters 
in relation to access to social protection.139 Cluster 1 is 
classified	as	‘full	to	high	access’	and	includes	countries	
where the self-employed are required to be covered 
by all insurance-based schemes. Cluster 2 comprises 
countries offering high to medium access, meaning that 
the self-employed are not required to be insured under all 
schemes but have the option to opt in. The third cluster 
includes countries offering medium to low access, where 
the self-employed are not required to be insured under 
one or more insurance scheme. They do, however, have 
the possibility to opt into some of the schemes, while 
being excluded from others. Finally, cluster 4 corresponds 
to the ‘low to no access’. It comprises countries in which 
the self-employed are prohibited from opting into one 
or more insurance-based scheme. For example, the 
self-employed cannot opt into unemployment insurance 
schemes in Belgium or Cyprus. Moreover, in France 
and Slovakia, the self-employed do not have access to 
occupational diseases and work-injury schemes. The 
distribution of countries by social protection cluster can 
be seen in Figure 15 (page 33).
As	regards	the	specific	case	of	platform	workers,	their	
situation and employment status vary widely from 
one platform, and country, to another, depending on 
their legal status. This factor adds to the complexity of 
mapping their social protection coverage. On this point, 
a 2018 Eurofound141 study conducted interviews with 
platform workers and found that their vast majority are 
able to identify their employment status. As previously 
explained, only a small percentage of platform workers 
primarily earn income through this type of work. As such, 
many already fall under existing employment statuses, 
such as employee, self-employed or occasional worker. 
In fact, of the total 41 interviewees, only 5 of them 
declared that they had no status. All of them took part in 
the online-contest type of platform work. Furthermore, 
the interviews highlighted that workers from three 
studied categories (i.e. online contest work, on-location 
platform-determined work, on-location worker-initiated 
work) had access to social security through their main 
activity. However, as previously mentioned, this varies 
according to employment status. Platform-determined 
workers declared themselves to be either employees or 
self-employed. In the case of on-location worker-initiated 
platforms, workers reported being either self-employed 
or ‘in-between-ers’, such as occasional workers. Finally, 
online contestants reported being self-employed or 
without employment status.
While pension systems seem to take the 
diversification of work arrangements  
into consideration in most EU countries, 
the picture is more diverse when  
looking at unemployment, sickness  
and maternity benefits.
However, most issues for workers taking part in several 
and new forms of work stem from effective rather than 
statutory coverage. Although temporary and part-time 
workers are both salaried employees who should qualify 
for social protection schemes, those legal rights are 
not always translated into effective coverage due to the 
difficulty	in	reaching	minimum	eligibility	requirements	
like working hours or contribution period. 
Given the issue with reaching requirement thresholds, 
there is a need to quantify the effective coverage of 
atypical workers. This can be done by analysing coverage 
criteria of social protection legislation and determining 
what types of workers are at risk of being excluded.142 
Based on this methodology, researchers indicate that 
the	EU	average	risk	of	not	receiving	benefits	was	12.9%	
for	unemployment	benefits	in	2014,	7.7%	for	sickness	
benefits	and	7.6%	for	maternity	leave	(see	Figure	16).
Pension coverage deserves special attention. Unlike 
other types of insurance-based protection, there is little 
risk of a total lack of coverage. However, temporary and 
part-time workers – who are more likely to have a career 
interruption, lower life-time earnings and a shorter 
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employment record – are likely to receive lower pension 
benefits	than	standard	employees.	For	self-employed	
workers, the picture is more complex. In most member 
states, pensions are compulsory, with 13 countries143 
having compulsory insurance and 3144 having  
first-tier	basic	pensions.	There	are	4	countries	where	 
the self-employed can opt out from pensions (UK, 
Ireland, Hungary, and Malta) and lose their rights. For 
the rest of the countries,145 pension law may have special 
conditions or separate schemes for the self-employed 
but they do not present substantial differences from the 
schemes for employees.146
This snapshot of social protection legislation highlights 
some of the still persisting social protection gaps that 
exist among different types of workers. Diverse national 
legislations create considerable differences between 
countries. While pension systems seem to take the 
diversification	of	work	arrangements	into	consideration	
in most EU countries, the picture is more diverse when 
looking at unemployment, sickness and maternity 
benefits.	In	such	cases,	there	is	a	great	amount	of	
heterogeneity regarding the access of self-employed 
workers as well as notable gaps for part-time and 
temporary workers.
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2.2.4 Worker representation
Data on working preferences highlights that some atypical 
workers prefer non-standard working patterns because 
of	the	associated	flexibility.	For	example,	in	2018,	only	
23.4%	of	part-time	workers147 were engaged in atypical 
work	because	they	could	not	find	traditional	forms	of	
employment.	By	contrast,	20.8%	preferred	part-time	
work	because	of	their	caring	responsibilities,	14.5%	opted	
for	part-time	work	for	family	reasons	and	10.7%	worked	
part-time due to ongoing school education or training. 
Similarly,	although	more	than	50%	of	temporary	workers	
chose	this	type	of	contract	because	they	could	not	find	a	
permanent job, we observe an increase in preference for 
temporary work, with the share of workers who did not 
seek	a	permanent	contract	growing	from	10.9%	in	2009	
to	13.5%	in	2018.	Furthermore,	data	collected	by	a	Zurich	
Insurance survey149 reveals that younger workers are 
more mobile and do not always aspire to the permanent, 
full-time	job	scenario,	with	41%	of	workers	in	their	20s	
reporting the intention to leave their job voluntarily.
Given the preference of some workers for new work 
arrangements, it is of central importance to solve the issues 
of working conditions and poor social protection without 
stifling	the	associated	advantages	of	flexibility.	One	tool	
that could reconcile workers preferences, social protection 
coverage and working conditions without imposing too 
much rigidity is social dialogue. However, trade unions’ 
efforts	to	reach	out	to	atypical	workers	have	intensified	only	
recently and, as shown in Figure 17, they are still hampered 
by low union density among this type of workers.
For a long time, accepting atypical workers has been 
a controversial issue for trade unions. Due to their 
development under Fordism, trade unions grew 
accustomed to a homogeneous group of members:  
“white,	male,	working	in	full-time	with	relatively	 
secure occupations”.151 Subsequently, their interests were 
geared towards the needs and characteristics of these 
groups of workers.152
That being said, Gumbrell-McCormick153 describes several 
developments that pressured worker organisations to 
accept atypical employment as a viable membership pool. 
First of all, an ageing working population contributed 
to the reduction of possible trade union recruits and a 
subsequent reduction in bargaining power. Secondly, 
atypical work became a staple of the modern economy 
that trade unions could no longer ignore. As a result, 
unions gradually acknowledged the new environment 
they were operating in and decided to integrate these 
workers into their ranks as a means of maintaining their 
capacity to act and negotiate.
As seen in Figure 17, despite trade union interest to 
enlarge their membership pool with atypical workers, 
they have had limited success so far. There are a few 
notable exceptions (e.g. Cyprus, Estonia, Slovakia) where 
union	membership	is	higher	among	fixed-term	contracts	
than open-ended ones. Looking at these numbers 
and the percentage of temporary employment out of 
the total, it can be observed that there is no relation 
between the number of temporary workers and their 
degree of unionisation. For example, France has low 
levels	of	unionised	workers	with	fixed-term	contracts	
(2%),	while	temporary	workers	make	up	a	high	share	
of	its	total	employment	(14.3%	in	2016).	By	contrast,	
in Estonia, temporary workers make up a low share 
of	total	employment	(3.4%	in	2016)	but	have	higher	
degrees of union membership compared to typical 
employees	(10%).154 This relation shows that the issue 
is not necessarily linked to the potential added value in 
bargaining power that temporary workers would bring, but 
is more complex and includes a mix of economic, social 
and cultural factors.
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As such, the legal background becomes important in 
understanding trade union membership among atypical 
workers. When it comes to self-employment, there are 
numerous barriers that limit the right of representation. 
According to an ILO convention,155 trade unions have 
the right to recruit and organise self-employed workers. 
However, some European countries (e.g. Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania) have adopted legislation 
that prevents most self-employed workers from being 
members of trade unions, or at least provides no clear 
right for them to become members.156 In other countries, 
legislation limits the right of trade union membership to 
specific	types	of	self-employed	workers.	As	an	example,	
in Austria, collective agreements can only be signed by 
bodies whose decision-making is independent from the 
other party. This means that self-employed workers with 
employees cannot be involved in union decision-making.
Even in countries that have not passed legislation 
to	specifically	prohibit	self-employed	workers	from	
joining unions, the application of competition law may 
prohibit it. In this vein, EU competition law was used 
to question the legality of minimum-fee arrangements 
that were unilaterally set by liberal profession workers’ 
organisations. Several cases in Italy and Bulgaria have 
established that these minimum-fee arrangements will be 
prohibited	unless	they	can	be	justified	on	the	grounds	of	
being necessary for the implementation of the legitimate 
objective of providing guarantees to customers or 
ensuring the implementation of legitimate objectives.157 
Apart from legal barriers in countries where self-
employed workers are allowed to join trade unions, some 
authors report discouraging attitudes which limit real/
effective access, particularly in the case of self-employed 
workers with employees.158 In spite of these barriers, 
there are countries in which social dialogue is taking 
root. In Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK, 
collective bargaining has been used successfully to set 
the terms and conditions of self-employed workers.
There is on average low trade union 
membership among atypical workers. The 
associated geographic variation is not 
tied to the prevalence of atypical work but 
rather to something less tangible, such as 
trade union attitudes.
Two strategies have been developed in order for platform 
workers to be represented in social dialogue: the 
expansion of existing unions to include platform workers 
as new members, or the creation of new organisations (i.e. 
work councils) by platform workers. 
It remains unknown which of the two strategies yield 
better results as this is a recent phenomenon. However, 
both have advantages and disadvantages. New trade 
unions face challenges in accessing experts, funds and 
networks. These are often prerequisites for effective 
sector-wide collective agreements. On the other hand, 
established trade unions tend to operate in a way that 
favours the majority of their members which, as shown 
earlier, are full-time employees. Some characteristics of 
atypical workers makes them hard to integrate, such as 
the blurred distinction between worker and employer.159 
To	sum	up	the	findings,	there	is	on	average	low	trade	
union membership among atypical workers. The 
associated geographic variation is not tied to the 
prevalence of atypical work but rather to something less 
tangible, such as trade union attitudes. Apart from those 
countries where self-employed workers are prohibited 
from unionising, and barring the added barriers 
imposed by competition law, cultural barriers have been 
identified	as	a	major	deterrent.	In	recent	years,	there	
have been several successful good practices of atypical 
workers being unionised, but more efforts and research 
are needed to analyse the impact and effectiveness of 
various recruitment strategies.
2.3  INTERIM CONCLUSIONS
This	chapter	aimed	to	better	understand	the	profile	
of atypical workers and the linkages between digital 
transformations,	diversification	of	work	arrangements,	
working conditions and access to social protection. 
The	analysis	confirms	that	the	distribution	across	
sectors is uneven. Furthermore, it indicates a mix 
of previously established and upcoming trends. For 
instance, while atypical employment is over-represented 
in certain economic sectors (e.g. agriculture, arts and 
entertainment activities) where it is traditionally 
prevalent, the share of high skilled people taking part in 
atypical	work	arrangements	has	significantly	increased.	
In the same vein, evidence suggests that the population 
taking part in atypical employment is ageing. This 
picture contradicts the popular belief that atypical 
employment is dominated by young, inexperienced and 
low skilled workers, which are often perceived as the 
new precariat of the 21st century. 
The overall picture is in fact much more complex and 
simplistic conclusions would be a mistake for several 
reasons. Firstly, it appears that tertiary education is 
no longer a shield against unstable jobs, and though 
it represented an asset in yesterday’s labour market, it 
does not necessarily hold true today. Secondly, although 
atypical workers suffer disproportionately from in-work 
poverty, lower social protection coverage and less 
bargaining power due to a low representation among 
trade unions, treating atypical workers as homogenous 
would be false. Atypical employment is diverse and 
the	situation	differs	significantly	from	one	country	
to another. In fact, some countries have managed to 
narrow the gap between atypical workers and standard 
employees, thus showing that public policies matter in 
that respect.
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Chapter 3: The broader implications of labour 
market transformations
The deep and far-reaching labour market transformations, 
which have been described in the previous chapters of this 
Issue Paper, have a number of lasting repercussions. They 
create new types of socioeconomic risks for individuals, 
put additional pressure on the welfare state and test the 
resilience of our social contract. If these implications are 
not well-anticipated and properly managed, they will be 
detrimental to both individuals and society at large. 
3.1 RISKS FOR INDIVIDUALS
While Chapter 2 focused on the impact of new forms of 
work on a number of individuals’ rights, such as access 
to social protection and collective representation, this 
section explores the consequences of the changing nature 
of work for a broader range of issues. In particular, it looks 
at the nature of atypical workers’ fears and anxieties, the 
impact of technologies on work-life balance and the rapid 
increase in mental health issues. It is important to note 
that the emergence of new socioeconomic risks does not 
only concern atypical workers, but can be seen across the 
whole of society. However, given the multiple insecurities 
and	specific	realities	atypical	workers	face	as	indicated	
earlier in this Paper, such risks are likely to be even more 
acute among this particular group. 
Mounting fears and anxieties 
Several surveys have been carried out to better 
understand the impact that new forms of work have on 
workers’ well-being. Survey outcomes indicate that three 
major aspects cause serious concerns among atypical 
workers: job insecurity, lack of predictability, and 
income insecurity in old age.
Three major aspects cause serious 
concerns among atypical workers: job 
insecurity, lack of predictability, and 
income insecurity in old age.
Evidence shows the relationship between atypical 
employment and concerns about job security. In fact, 
a 2010 Eurofound study160 indicates that atypical 
workers are disproportionately affected, compared to 
standard employees: they are three times more likely 
to	be	worried	about	losing	their	job	(34%	compared	to	
11%).	Similarly,	a	2017	study161 reports that around a 
third	(33.3%)	of	platform	workers	fear	losing	their	job,	
compared	to	only	16%	of	standard	employees.
With respect to predictability, the picture is more 
complex. While atypical workers appear to have strong 
preferences	for	flexible	working	time,162	this	flexibility	can	
create unpredictable working environments. Interviews 
with atypical workers reveal that in some instances, the 
flexibility	is	all	one-sided.	For	example,	some	zero-hours	
workers expressed concerns about the predictability of 
their workload as they had no genuine option to turn 
down offers of work.163 Furthermore, research also shows 
that in the case of platform workers, securing as much 
work as they would like is not easy. In fact, a 2016 ILO 
paper164	indicates	that	85%	of	surveyed	workers	in	the	
US would have liked to do more platform work. The main 
reason	preventing	them	was	the	insufficient	number	of	
tasks available on the platforms.
Another issue which concerns platform workers is the 
predictability of pay. According to a study conducted for 
the European Parliament,165	more	than	50%	of	platform	
workers	report	payment	delays	and	over	75%	report	
having to put in more time than agreed. As a result, fear 
over predictability of hours and predictability of pay is 
a recurrent issue for people engaged in new forms of 
employment.
Furthermore,	the	fear	of	insufficient/inadequate	
income protection in old age was investigated in a 
Zurich Insurance and Oxford University survey, which 
assessed the ownership of income protection or term 
life insurance, be it a private, individual purchase or 
as	a	group-plan	membership.	Interesting	findings	
emerge from the survey, such as the relatively low level 
of ownership and major differences by gender, age, 
primary wage earner, and the task type of the worker.166 
The survey covers seven EU countries (Finland, the UK, 
Romania, Germany, Spain, Ireland and Italy) and points 
to a general societal failure to address this concern.167
As seen in Figure 18, in four out of the seven surveyed 
EU countries (i.e. Germany, Ireland, Italy,and the UK), 
the	biggest	financial	concern	for	all	types	of	workers	is	
retirement. Interestingly, we can observe that typical 
workers do also feel even more concerned about old age 
income than atypical workers in certain countries. By 
contrast, the latter are generally more worried about 
monthly bills than typical workers.  
For Spain and Finland, retirement is still the main 
concern for typical workers whereas atypical workers 
are more concerned with paying their monthly bills. In 
Romania however, paying monthly bills represents the 
main concern for both typical and atypical workers. 
Given the high levels of concern, it is important to look 
at old age protection legislation for atypical workers. 
As previously shown, pension contributions are usually 
mandatory for most types of atypical workers (e.g. 
temporary and part-time workers). However, due to the 
low pay, career breaks and shorter contribution time, these 
workers have lower old age protection. Furthermore, in 
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some countries, pension schemes are not mandatory for 
self-employed workers and require voluntary enrolment. 
In addition, some countries do not allow self-employed 
workers to join general pension funds, but rather create 
separate schemes. These might be problematic due to their 
lower	scale	and	associated	loss	of	efficiency	(see	Infobox	
5). As argued in De Nederlandsche Bank’s paper from 2006, 
scale	influences	both	administrative	and	investment	costs	
with	industry-wide	pension	funds	being	more	efficient	
than smaller ones, such as company funds.169 Lastly, in the 
case	of	platform	workers,	more	than	56%	of	them	lack	old	
age income protection of any sort.170  
Evidence of the fears and concerns of atypical workers is 
also underpinned by additional data on work-life balance 
and the pressure that new forms of work can create for 
mental and physical health. 
Work-life balance
ICTs have profoundly transformed the way people 
work. With the advent of mobile technology, portable 
computing and the means to communicate anytime and 
anywhere, the line between work and personal life has 
blurred. Research shows that the impacts of telework 
and ICT-mobile work (T/ICTM)172 on work-life balance 
are highly ambiguous, if not contradictory. On the one 
hand, entering the digital world has allowed certain 
workers to perform T/ICTM anytime and outside of the 
traditional	office	environment,	thus	enabling	them	to	
combine personal engagements and family life with a 
professional career. Furthermore, workers using these 
technologies report an improved work-life balance due 
to reduced commuting time and greater working-time 
flexibility	and	autonomy.	
On the other hand, it has been found that these 
individuals tend to work longer hours than average 
employees and often in the evening and over weekends 
(e.g. checking emails or making phone calls while 
commuting	to/from	the	office,	performing	ICT-based	
work	outside	office	hours).	T/ICTM	can	therefore	not	only	
be	a	substitute	to	traditional	office-based	work	but	also	
add to normal working hours, which are often informal 
and unpaid. This creates a blurred boundary between paid 
work and personal life, with more interferences between 
the two spheres and a direct impact on workers’ health.
INFOBOX 5. Efficiency of pension funds
The efficiency of pension funds is measured as the return to 
investment minus the operating costs of the fund. While more 
people bring more money to the pension funds, two operating 
costs remain quite similar: administrative costs and investment 
costs. Administrative costs range from file management to 
communication with members, while investment costs  
relate more to activities such as risk management and 
performance evaluation.171 
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Mental health in the workplace and its economic impact
The changes that digitalisation has brought to the labour 
market also have implications for workers’ mental health. 
Moreover, as seen in Chapter 1, new technologies are 
modifying job content and tasks by, for instance, reducing 
the time for decision-making, creating a constant need 
to react quickly to events or reducing the number of 
interpersonal relations in favour of more time spent at a 
computer. All of these changes put pressure on individuals 
that can impact mental and physical health, which add to 
the existing challenges regarding safety and health at work.
New technologies are modifying job content 
and tasks by, for instance, reducing the time 
for decision-making, creating a constant 
need to react quickly to events or reducing 
the number of interpersonal relations in 
favour of more time spent at a computer.
When studying the workplace, psychosocial risks 
and work-related stress are already among the most 
challenging concerns in terms of occupational safety and 
health. One in two European workers report that work-
related stress is common in their workplace.173 Moreover, 
workers across Europe consider exposure to stress to be 
the primary occupational risk, followed by ergonomic 
risks due to repetitive movements or tiring positions.174 
Work-related stress has a negative impact on productivity, 
reduces worker performance and causes absenteeism.
Health and safety risks have also been associated with new 
forms of work enabled by ICTs, such as crowdsourcing.175 
Particularly concerning are the psychosocial risks that 
might arise from the peculiar working conditions in 
such new forms of jobs. Crowdsourcing work is often 
characterised by a high level of precariousness and 
flexibility,	as	the	workers	are	often	required	to	work	at	very	
short notice and there is no certainty that they will have 
work from one day to the next. Many people in these new 
forms of work experience barriers to social protection, 
from	health	services	to	unemployment	benefits.	With	the	
addition of risk factors like isolation and lack of social 
support, it becomes clear that these new forms of work 
have the potential to negatively impact workers’ mental 
and physical (good) health. 
Mental health-related costs are likely to 
be further aggravated if the working and 
living conditions of atypical workers are 
not improved.
The impact of mental health problems on EU societies 
and economies is already huge. Tens of millions of 
Europeans suffer from a mental health problem every 
year. The direct costs of mental illness on healthcare 
and social security systems and indirect costs on the 
economies are estimated to be enormous (see Infobox 6). 
Furthermore, mental health-related costs are likely to be 
further aggravated if the working and living conditions of 
atypical workers are not improved.
3.2  THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE  
WELFARE STATE
Broadly speaking, the main challenge for current social 
protection systems is the growing imbalance between the 
number	of	welfare	beneficiaries	and	welfare	contributors.	
This	imbalance	is	influenced	by	several	factors,	not	least	
demographic ageing and unemployment.
One way to assess the sustainability of our welfare state 
is to look at the so-called economic dependency ratio 
(see	Infobox	7).	Figure	19	indicates	the	recent	evolution	
of the economic dependency ratio from 2008 to 2016. 
While the reduction in unemployment in recent years 
has led to a slight decrease in the economic dependency 
ratio,	there	has	been	an	overall	increase	from	61.6%	in	
2008	to	64.1%	in	2016.	This	correlates	with	the	ageing	
of the European population and the growing number of 
people drawing their pension.
Looking at the evolution of the economic dependency 
ratio can help explain how this relation will change 
over time and the magnitude of the efforts needed to 
curb the imbalance. By doing so, Figure 20 presents two 
scenarios for the future economic dependency rate. For 
the number of employed and unemployed, the projections 
were developed using Eurostat population projection 
data by age group and hypothetical employment and 
unemployment rates. With respect to the number of 
INFOBOX 6. The heavy burden of poor mental health 
across Europe
It has been estimated that in 2016, mental illness affected 
about 84 million citizens, with the most common disorders 
being anxiety and depression (46 million people). In 2015, 
this number was thought to represent more than €600 billion, 
or more than 4% of the GDP across EU countries. The direct 
costs for healthcare and social security systems (e.g. medical 
visits, pharmaceutical and hospitalisation costs, paid sick leave, 
disability benefits) amounted to €360 billion, while indirect 
costs caused by lower employment rates, greater absenteeism 
and lower productivity accounted for the remaining €240 billion. 
In fact, these figures are an underestimate, as other additional 
costs (e.g. social assistance, work-injury benefits, lost working 
hours for informal caregivers) are not accounted.177 
INFOBOX 7. Economic dependency ratio
Economic dependency ratio is an indicator which describes the 
relationship between those who are economically dependent 
(e.g. unemployed persons of working age, pensioners) and 
economically active (15-64 age group). This indicator is helpful 
when analysing how much pressure an economy bears in terms 
of its non-productive population and how this is compensated 
by the population in employment. 
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pension	beneficiaries,	Figure	20	uses	the	projections	in	
the European Commission’s 2018 Ageing Report.180
Many atypical workers will not be able to 
access decent pensions. Therefore, there is 
a risk of them becoming the new ‘retired 
poor’, dependent on additional welfare 
provisions and creating additional burdens 
for the welfare state.
The	first	scenario	presented	in	Figure	20	(red	
curve) assumes a constant level of employment 
and	unemployment	based	on	2018	rates	(i.e.	73.7%	
employment	rate	and	7%	unemployment	rate).	
According to this scenario, the dependency rate will 
reach	83.5%	by	2050.	In	absolute	numbers,	this	would	
mean that 220 million workers will support 184 pension 
and	unemployment	provision	beneficiaries.
The second projection (grey) makes more generous 
assumptions about future employment and 
unemployment	rates	(80%	employment	rate	and	3%	
unemployment rate). According to this projection, 
dependency	falls	to	71.9%	by	2050.	The	difference	with	
the	first	scenario	shows	how	the	employment	rate	can	
influence	the	equilibrium	between	welfare	beneficiaries	
and contributors, and in the end, the sustainability of the 
welfare state.
While the projections made above point to the 
importance of maintaining high levels of employment, 
they do not take into consideration the growing number 
of people engaged in new forms of work. Given their 
limited social protection coverage and lower old age 
protection (as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3), many 
atypical workers will not be able to access decent 
pensions. Therefore, there is a risk of them becoming 
the new ‘retired poor’, dependent on additional welfare 
provisions and creating additional burdens for the welfare 
state. As a result, the already gloomy projections are 
likely to look worse. Furthermore, it is fair to say that 
the employers and employees engaging in typical work 
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY RATIO OF EU28 COUNTRIES
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
 Fig. 19 
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY RATE PROJECTIONS
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
 Fig. 20 
Source: Authors, based on Eurostat178 and the European Commission 50 the 2018 Ageing Report
Source: Authors, based on Eurostat179 and the European Commission 50 the 2018 Ageing Report
42
arrangements will be subsidising our welfare system by 
supporting people who have not been able to put aside 
financial	savings	to	cope	with	socioeconomic	risks,	such	
as sickness, parental leave or old age. 
Due to this issue, many point to the need for workers to 
access private insurance. However, as shown by the Zurich 
Insurance and Oxford University study,181 there is an 
unequal distribution of insurance products across workers. 
In each country women own fewer insurance products 
(ranging	from	13%	to	33%)	than	men	(14%	to	39%).	In	
addition, workers involved in knowledge-intensive jobs 
tend to own such products more than manual workers. 
In a nutshell, the study points out that more vulnerable 
workers appear to have less protection. In view of this, it 
is clear that more needs to be done to ensure a more equal 
distribution of insurance products across workers and 
guarantee the long-term sustainability of the welfare state. 
3.3  PERSPECTIVES FOR OUR FUTURE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT 
The erosion of the contributory tax base and the 
emergence	of	financing	gaps	jeopardises	the	viability	of	
our social contract and the main principles underpinning 
it. Our social contract is based on solidarity between 
generations and socioeconomic groups. This contract 
strives to give working people a just share of economic 
progress and wealth, and, together with the former 
structure of the labour market where labour had high 
return, it has helped contain the rise in inequality and 
establish a strong middle class. The major tools in turning 
such a contract into reality include social protection, 
redistributive mechanisms and social dialogue. At the 
same time, our social contract has largely contributed to 
social justice, socioeconomic cohesion and peace, which 
have convinced most people that an economy underpinned 
by such a social contract can hold societies together and 
deliver progress for most. 
The new income distribution between 
labour and capital has put additional 
strain on social dialogue.
Social dialogue is fundamental in accompanying 
transitioning workers by coupling them with employers 
to identify joint solutions together and reach agreements 
through collective bargaining. Historically, social dialogue 
has played an important role in improving the wages 
and working conditions of millions of European workers. 
Nevertheless, social dialogue is not always as constructive 
in	some	sectors	and	countries	as	it	should	be,	firstly	
because the unionisation of workers is on the decline 
in	almost	all	EU	countries.	This	is	now	amplified	by	the	
growing number of atypical workers who are potentially 
not covered by any collective agreement. Secondly, because 
social partners often operate defensively, they undermine 
the	capacity	to	work	together	and	define	a	joint	agenda.	
Furthermore, the new income distribution between labour 
and capital has put additional strain on social dialogue. 
This	distribution	has	increasingly	benefited	capital	to	the	
detriment of labour, thus diminishing the bargaining power 
of workers and weakening the link between productivity 
gains and wages. In fact, wages as a share of GDP have 
fallen	in	the	most	advanced	economies	since	the	late	1970s	
while	the	profit	share	has	risen	(see	Figure	21).182
Europe’s ability to reinvigorate a 
constructive and efficient social dialogue 
will determine how inclusive tomorrow’s 
world of work will be.
Additional existing trends foreshadow the dismantling 
of our social contract, raising central questions about its 
future. The coverage gaps in our social protection system 
and the emergence of new groups of workers falling 
through the cracks of labour regulation, as described 
earlier, is but one signal. Another is the increased 
polarisation of the labour market, which appears set 
to continue, with the rapid spread of digitalisation and 
automation and the corresponding challenges for the 
middle class. Numerous EU countries witness growing 
inequalities, with middle incomes growing more slowly 
than those at the top (see Figure 22) and an increased 
level of vulnerability and insecurity among the middle 
class. Besides changes in income distribution, however, 
the question of the composition of the middle class 
appears to endanger our social contract. In fact, 
according to an OECD study,183 the relationship between 
occupational skill level and household income is 
changing. Whereas previously middle skilled jobs were 
largely held by the middle class, this is no longer true 
today. In other words, the probability that middle skilled 
workers are in the lower-income class has increased 
significantly.	
Despite its weakening, social dialogue remains a crucial 
instrument to address these growing challenges. Its 
role in framing the world of work and ensuring that all 
workers are represented equally with a strong bargaining 
position regardless of the sector and company they work 
in and/or their employment status will be fundamental. 
In short, Europe’s ability to reinvigorate a constructive 
and	efficient	social	dialogue	will	determine	how	
inclusive tomorrow’s world of work will be. 
3.4  INTERIM CONCLUSIONS
While it is true that atypical workers have less social 
protection coverage and less bargaining power, as 
described in Chapter 2, the new realities of people’s 
working lives have, in general, less visible but equally 
insidious consequences. People’s working environments 
(as a general trend, i.e. regardless of their employment 
status) appear to be more stressful than in the past and 
technologies often blur the line between private and 
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professional lives. In addition, atypical workers face a 
number of fears and anxieties, such as job insecurity,  
lack of predictability and income insecurity in old age.  
All of this has made mental health problems a salient 
issue of the 21st century. 
Moreover, the effects are also at the society level. 
The	diversification	of	work	arrangements	reduces	
the number of people who effectively contribute to 
our welfare system, thus aggravating the already 
unsustainable	relationship	between	welfare	beneficiaries	
and contributors. This also undermines our social 
contract and its redistributive principle at a time when 
technologies are accelerating the polarisation of the 
labour market and the erosion of the middle class. 
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Chapter 4: Addressing labour market 
transformations – A proliferation of initiatives  
and actors
The pressing question of whether Europe’s welfare 
states can withstand the much-publicised labour market 
transformations has pushed member states, their 
governments as well as a number of labour market players 
to act. The measures undertaken so far are various and 
deal with different aspects of the changing nature of 
work and its consequences, leading to a proliferation of 
initiatives and actors. This chapter reviews some of these 
initiatives by distinguishing them by type of actors: public 
authorities at the national level (4.1), private sector (4.2), 
and the European and international governance levels 
(4.3). It also considers the consequences this proliferation 
of initiatives and actors might have for the future design 
of Europe’s welfare states, especially for the delivery of 
certain welfare provisions.
4.1 PUBLIC POLICIES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
Given the broad implications that the future of work has 
for the entire economy, European countries are trying 
to formulate policy responses to prepare societies and 
equip people for upcoming changes. The policy measures 
span a broad spectrum of aspects, from enhancing social 
protection provisions, addressing grey areas in labour 
regulations, ensuring effective social protection coverage 
(including previously excluded groups) and providing 
equal rights to training. The policy priorities vary from 
one country to another, as do their target groups. For 
instance, while some countries focus on issues associated 
with part-time work, others prioritise their actions 
towards temporary workers and/or the self-employed. The 
reform agenda followed by each country and its concrete 
outcomes therefore depend on a number of factors, such 
as the current provisions in national labour laws, the 
efficiency	and	constructivism	of	social	partners,	the	scope	
of existing coverage gaps, welfare traditions and the 
intensity of public pressure on certain aspects. 
The reform agenda followed by each 
country and its concrete outcomes depend 
on a number of factors, such as the current 
provisions in national labour laws, the 
efficiency and constructivism of social 
partners, the scope of existing coverage 
gaps, welfare traditions and the intensity 
of public pressure on certain aspects.
This section presents a set of inspiring initiatives that 
showcase how the welfare state can adapt to labour 
market transformations by adjusting and modernising 
its policy and regulatory framework. The measures 
highlighted below have been selected according to their 
relevance to the main challenges raised in Chapters 
1 and 2, not least the unequal access to training 
opportunities,	the	misclassification	of	workers,	the	
absence of labour market intermediaries and collective 
bargaining power for self-employed workers, in-work 
poverty as well as the social protection coverage gaps 
between standard employees and atypical workers. 
Most of them have also been discussed throughout 
the	activities	of	the	EPC	project,	“The	future	of	work	–	
Towards a progressive agenda for all”. 
Starting with unequal access to training opportunities, 
several countries are trying to address the cost 
differential associated with training programmes 
for different categories of workers. In fact, access to 
upskilling programmes supported by public subsidies 
might be denied to some categories of workers, such as 
the self-employed. The solution developed in Austria 
was to put in place regional funding schemes which 
can be accessed by paying social contributions. As an 
example, the so-called waff training account developed 
in	Vienna	provides	training	grants	to	a	specific	group	
of self-employed workers, the Neue Selbständige, 
including artists and journalists, which represents a 
hybrid category between employees and self-employed 
workers.186 
France is also currently putting in place a major reform 
of its training system, the Compte personnel de formation, 
overhauling the landscape of vocational training. 
Among the novel elements of the reform is the creation 
of individual rights to vocational training for all active 
people that can be accessed, updated and managed 
directly by individuals on a digital platform. Through 
their individual accounts, workers can have access to 
certain	certified	training	programmes	corresponding	
to their professional path and possible desire for up- or 
reskilling. Each training programme is converted into a 
certain amount of euros and individuals’ accounts are 
credited on a yearly basis, depending on the number of 
hours worked.187
On	the	issue	of	worker	classification,	there	are	a	great	
number of policy responses. One approach pursued 
by Slovenia and the Netherlands is to reduce the tax 
differences between different contracts to reduce the 
incentive	for	misclassification.	Another	measure	is	to	
enforce	existing	regulations	for	workers’	classification	
by simplifying enforcement procedures or by creating 
targeted inspections. In its attempt to implement this 
kind of policy, Ireland issued inspections based on 
consultations with trade unions.188 Another solution 
comes in the form of extending rights to workers in the 
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grey	area.	In	this	respect,	in	January	2019,	an	Italian	court	
ruled that the compensation for home-delivery platform 
workers should be based on the compensation paid to 
employees in the same sector (see Case Study 1).
As regards social dialogue and self-employed workers’ 
rights to collective bargaining, experiences vary 
greatly across countries, and some member states have 
implemented inspiring practices. For instance, some 
existing unions in Germany opened their membership 
to platform workers (i.e. IG Metall and ver.di, which are 
the two largest unions in Germany).190 In France, besides 
existing unions integrating platform workers, there is 
also the example of drivers of a large platform creating 
their own union.191	Moreover,	in	2018,	the	first	collective	
agreement between a social partner and a platform was 
signed in Denmark.192 
Closing social protection gaps for workers has already 
been subject to intense policy efforts across the EU, even if 
the issue is far from being resolved. The policy responses 
implemented so far tackle different problems and 
therefore take various forms, such as lower legal minimum 
thresholds on working time, duration of employment or 
earned income to become eligible for social protection 
schemes; harmonised social protection schemes across 
types of workers; or the possibility for self-employed 
workers to accumulate entitlements in individual accounts. 
As	regards	the	first	aspect,	the	Netherlands	has	made	
sure that every hour worked by part-time workers counts 
towards social insurance contributions, thus removing 
legal minimum thresholds. A similar approach has been 
implemented in Denmark whereby a new unemployment 
benefit	scheme	treats	all	income	sources	equally	(see	Case	
Study	2).	In	addition	to	creating	a	level	playing	field,	it	also	
encourages the transition between salaried employment 
with other forms of work such as self-employment or 
platform work. 
With respect to entitlements for self-employed workers, 
some countries have integrated them into existing social 
security schemes, while others such as Italy,194 Spain195 and 
France have created separate schemes which allow certain 
categories of workers to have access to unemployment 
benefits.	This	is	the	case	for	‘dependent	self-employed	
workers’, which constitute a distinct category in Spain and 
Italy, and for artists in France. 
4.2 PRIVATE INITIATIVES
The private sector has not been exempt from pressure 
to change and has used its creative power to address the 
growing public attention that new forms of work have 
sparked over the recent years. 
The most well-known example is Uber, the transportation 
company which organises its services around digital 
applications. Uber started a decade ago as a provider 
of ride-hailing services through a smartphone app. It 
is active today in more than 600 cities worldwide, with 
some 3 million drivers and delivery partners globally, of 
which more than 150,000 are in the EU.196 Uber’s business 
model is based on connecting passengers to drivers who 
use their own cars to provide the service. Such a business 
model entails no exclusivity, minimum commitment nor 
shifts, meaning that drivers are not bound to working 
schedules and can choose when and for how long they 
will	provide	the	service.	The	profits	from	the	ride	are	
then divided between Uber and the drivers. While it 
started as a company offering car rides on demand, it has 
expanded today to provide services ranging from sharing 
on-demand electric bikes to delivering food.
The private sector has not been exempt 
from pressure to change and has used its 
creative power to address the growing 
public attention that new forms of work 
have sparked over the recent years.
The	degree	of	flexibility	that	characterises	Uber’s	business	
model is also a reason for harsh public criticism, as 
flexibility	comes	at	risk	of	precariousness	for	the	workers.	
For a long time, Uber has been seen as the symbol of 
labour market deregulation and new forms of precarious 
work, to the extent that the ‘Uberisation of work’ is now 
a term referring to the gig economy and its implications 
for new models of work. The criticisms are mostly related 
to concerns that such new forms of work are insecure and 
fragmented, with poor, if any, access to social protection. 
Work on demand, such as that on the app-driven labour 
market, is temporary and irregular by nature, and does not 
offer job security or income stability. 
Uber is attempting to address public criticism of its business 
model and workers’ complaints by reconciling independent 
work,	flexibility	and	decent	working	conditions.	In	2018,	it	
launched the Partner Protection Insurance,197 an EU-wide 
CASE STUDY 1: The extension of employment 
protection in Italy
On 11 January 2019, the Court of Appeal of Turin ruled that 
compensation to home delivery platform workers should be 
based on the compensation paid to employees of the same 
sector. This ruling builds on Article 2 of Legislative Decree 
81/2015 which established the extension of employment 
protection to autonomous (i.e. self-employed) workers who 
continuously collaborate with a main client who organises their 
activity in terms of workplace and working time.189
CASE STUDY 2: The new unemployment insurance 
scheme in Denmark
In May 2017, Denmark adopted a new unemployment insurance 
scheme for workers in non-standard jobs. The reform seeks 
to provide better unemployment insurance coverage to the 
growing number of workers in new or combined forms of 
employment (e.g. self-employed workers, persons with multiple 
jobs, persons combining employment and self-employment). 
Under this new scheme, eligibility rules are based on the total 
(work-related) income, which also comprises earnings from 
salaried employment, non-standard and self-employment.193
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insurance package at no extra cost to the drivers. The central 
feature of this scheme is that it offers both on- and off-trip 
coverage, providing the drivers with protection in case of 
accidents while driving, but also coverage in case of events 
while off-trip, such as one-off maternity and paternity 
payments or compensation for severe sickness and injury 
(see Infobox 8).
Other innovative initiatives aiming to either enhance 
the social protection provisions of atypical workers or 
address the wider implications their employment status 
has on their life can be found among private employment 
agencies. In that respect, the World Employment 
Confederation, which represents the recruitment and 
employment industry at the global level, has launched 
a database collecting the best practices of the sector. 
One of the examples provided in their Social Innovation 
Stories database199 is in the Netherlands where agency 
workers were unable to apply for a mortgage loan, thus 
representing a major hindrance for such workers to 
create personal safety nets. Together with banks, the 
Dutch association for employment agencies set up an 
accredited method allowing for the big data assessment of 
a person’s future employability and earning capacity. This 
assessment is then presented in a ‘prospect statement’ 
that banks can use in their decision to provide the loan. 
Another example can be found in France, where the French 
association of private employment agencies, Prism’emploi, 
offers a supplementary health insurance scheme to 
agency workers. This scheme complements the one 
provided by the French state and covers medical costs and 
hospitalisation for workers and their family members.200  
Finally, the current shifts reshaping the world of work 
have led to the emergence of new intermediary bodies. 
For instance, SMART201 is a Europe-wide cooperative 
of	freelancers	founded	in	Belgium	in	1998,	with	offices	
in	other	eight	European	countries.	It	is	a	not-for-profit	
organisation that acts as a labour market intermediary 
between	workers	and	firms	and	provides	a	wide	range	
of services to its members, from administration to 
accounting	and	financial	services.	By	joining	this	
organisation, self-employed workers become ‘formally 
employed’	and	benefit	from	mechanisms	that	are	in	place	
for standard forms of work, such as income predictability. 
More	specifically,	SMART	invoices	contractors	on	behalf	
of its members and pays the salaries directly to the latter, 
after deducting taxes, contributions and a fee. Income 
predictability is ensured by means of SMART advancing the 
payment of the salary, even if the contractor has not yet 
paid the invoice. This intermediary role extends to other 
services such as legal assistance, training, provision of 
insurance against client bankruptcy and co-working spaces.
4.3  INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES AND EU 
POLICIES
Addressing the ongoing labour market transformations 
and seizing the opportunities presented by such changes 
to	strengthen	the	welfare	state	and	make	it	fit	for	the	
future	are	also	priorities	identified	at	the	supranational	
level. Policy recommendations and frameworks of 
principles have been designed to support national 
governments in their actions.
The future of work is shaping the international agenda by 
becoming, for instance, a major topic discussed in the G20 
forum. In 2018, the heads of state met to discuss policy 
options for issues associated with the future of work,202 to 
disseminate ideas and spearhead proposals to make the 
economy more productive, redistribute the wealth created 
by automation and implement fair taxation for new forms 
of work. Apart from the policy examples, the meeting 
stressed the importance of improving international 
coordination,	increasing	knowledge-sharing	and	finding	
room for common efforts on how to accompany the future 
of work. 
Additionally, and as part of its Future of Work Centenary 
Initiative, the ILO set up the Global Commission on the 
Future of Work, an independent and diverse group of 
experts, in August 2017 to examine the changes occurring 
in the world of work and provide recommendations to 
address the challenges posed by such changes. In its 
landmark	report,	published	in	January	2019,	the	Global	
Commission	outlines	a	vision	for	a	“human-centred	
agenda for the future of work”203 that places people and 
their work at the centre of social and economic policies. 
The report puts forward a set of recommendations to 
promote people’s capabilities, ensure that the institutions 
of	work	are	fit	for	the	future,	and	provide	decent	and	
sustainable work opportunities for all. 
In particular, the Global Commission calls on national 
governments to invest in people’s capabilities through a 
universal entitlement to lifelong learning. An effective 
lifelong learning ecosystem would enable people to receive 
the necessary formal and informal learning, from basic 
education to adult and in-work training, thus supporting 
them through future of work transitions, including changes 
triggered by new technologies. The report also calls for 
guaranteed universal social protection, from birth to old 
age, to support workers and their families and help them 
participate in the labour market. Governments must 
design social protection systems that afford a basic level of 
protection to all in need and extend adequate protection to 
all types of workers. 
The Global Commission also calls on governments 
to strengthen the institutions governing work, as an 
important step to reducing inequality, enhancing security 
and ensuring social justice. In particular, it suggests the 
establishment of a Universal Labour Guarantee, including 
workers’ fundamental rights and a set of basic working 
INFOBOX 8. The Uber insurance package198
Uber’s insurance scheme offers both on- and off-trip coverage. 
All independent/self-employed Uber partners are eligible for 
the benefits of on-trip coverage. Off-trip benefits are accessible 
to ‘Active Uber Partners’, or workers who completed 150 (drivers) 
or 30 trips (delivery partners) in the 8 preceding weeks. Off-trip 
coverage comprises benefits such as one-off maternity and 
paternity leave of €1,000, and compensation for sickness or 
injuries amounting to a daily payment of €40 which start from 
day 8 up to a further 15 days.
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conditions, such as limits on hours of work, an adequate 
living wage and safe and healthy workplaces. Moreover, the 
Global Commission emphasises the need for governments 
and employers’ and workers’ organisations to closely 
monitor and steer the impact of new technologies on work. 
In	particular,	the	report	suggests	adopting	a	“human-
in-command” approach towards the deployment of AI 
solutions	to	make	sure	that	final	decisions	impacting	
work are always taken by humans. When considering 
the	diversification	of	work	arrangements,	especially	
platform work, it also recommends the development of 
an international governance system that establishes a set 
of minimum rights and protection to be guaranteed to 
platform workers and clients. 
The Pillar is the most comprehensive EU 
initiative relevant to the challenges raised 
by the future of work since it addresses the 
areas of equal opportunities and access to 
the labour market, fair working conditions, 
as well as social protection and inclusion.
 
When moving from the international to the European 
context, it is important to consider EU institutional 
action in pushing for greater social progress and cohesion 
between and within EU member states. 
This	ambition	is	well	reflected	in	the	European	Pillar	of	
Social Rights (EPSR),204 an interinstitutional proclamation by 
the European Commission, the Council and the Parliament 
that was adopted and launched in November 2017 at the 
Social Summit of Gothenburg. The Pillar is designed as a set 
of 20 principles and rights aiming to serve as a compass for 
a renewed process of upward convergence towards better 
working and living conditions. It is the most comprehensive 
EU initiative relevant to the challenges raised by the future 
of work since it addresses the areas of equal opportunities 
and access to the labour market, fair working conditions, as 
well as social protection and inclusion. 
As part of the rollout of the Pillar, a set of legislative 
measures have been put in place, including:
q  a Regulation establishing a European Labour 
Authority	2019/1149;
q  a Directive on work-life balance for parents and 
carers;
q  a Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working 
Conditions	2019/1152;	and
q  a Council Recommendation on access to social 
protection	2019/C	387/01.
In	June	2019,	the	Parliament	and	the	Council	adopted	the	
Regulation establishing a European Labour Authority205 
to ensure the effective application and enforcement of 
EU law related to labour mobility. The Authority, which 
will have an annual budget of approximately €50 million, 
will assist member states and the Commission with the 
coordination of social security systems across countries. 
Along with the establishment of the Authority, the 
Directive on work-life balance for parents and carers 
was	adopted	in	June	2019	with	the	main	objective	
being to reconcile parents’ and carers’ professional and 
private lives while also increasing the participation of 
women in the labour market. To that end, the Directive 
introduces measures such as the individual right to four 
months’ parental leave, a carers’ leave for workers caring 
for relatives and the right for these workers to request 
flexible	arrangements.
The Directive on transparent and predictable working 
conditions in the European Union was adopted in June 
2019.	This	revised	Directive,	repealing	Directive	91/553,	
aims to guarantee that all workers, regardless of previous 
specific	working	arrangements,	should	be	provided	with	
more in-depth and complete information regarding 
essential aspects of their work (e.g. place of work, 
description of the work, remuneration), which are to be 
received by the worker, in writing, either by the seventh 
calendar	day	starting	on	the	first	working	day	or	within	one	
month	of	the	first	working	day	(the	timing	depends	on	the	
type of information to be provided), instead of up to two 
months afterwards, as it is now. The Directive stipulates 
that	the	text	will	apply	to	“every	worker	in	the	Union	who	
has an employment contract or employment relationship 
as	defined	by	the	law,	collective	agreements	or	practice	
in force in each Member State with consideration to the 
case-law of the Court of Justice”.206 Thus, all workers who 
match the criteria established by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) will be covered by this Directive 
(including those working on a zero-hours contract), except 
those whose predetermined and actual working time is 
equal to or less than an average of three hours per week in 
a reference period of four consecutive weeks. In addition, it 
is important to note that self-employed persons do not fall 
within the scope of the Directive.
In March 2018 the Commission tabled a proposal for a 
Council Recommendation on access to social protection 
of workers and the self-employed to support workers in 
non-standard forms of employment and self-employment 
who have limited access to social protection and are 
thus exposed to higher economic insecurity. The 
ministers for employment and social affairs adopted 
the Recommendation during the Employment, Social 
Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO) 
in	November	2019.207 This Recommendation calls on 
member states to provide access to adequate social 
protection to all workers and self-employed persons and 
to	establish	minimum	standards	in	this	field.	
In addition, the Commission commits to support member 
states in achieving the objectives of the Recommendation 
by promoting mutual learning activities, improving 
statistics on social protection, and establishing 
a monitoring framework to assess the national 
implementation of the Recommendations. In return, 
member states are asked to provide reliable and detailed 
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data on access to the various forms of social protection 
and submit a plan setting out the corresponding national 
measures of the Recommendation. 
Besides legislative measures, the Commission also 
made real efforts to mainstream the EPSR across the 
EU’s main strategic instruments. For instance, the 
documents issued as part of the European Semester,208 
not least the country reports, refer to the Pillar and 
consider aspects such as poverty and social exclusion, 
labour market segmentation, in-work poverty as well 
as social protection. Furthermore, these reports also 
assess the performance of each country against a 
set of employment and social indicators called the 
Social Scoreboard,209 which is designed to support the 
monitoring of the Pillar. 
The methodology210 applied to the Social Scoreboard is 
well thought out as it provides a comparative analysis 
over time and across countries, thus encouraging 
progress and peer pressure. In addition, the Commission 
has often referred to how the EU budget could be used 
to support the implementation of the Pillar and its 
accompanying measures. The Commission has advanced 
different proposals to strengthen the Union’s social 
dimension through EU funds for the next EU budget 
2021-2027. In particular, the European Social Fund 
Plus	(ESF+),	the	EU’s	main	instrument	to	implement	
the principles of the Pillar, should count on a budget 
allocation	of	€101	billion	for	the	next	financial	period,	
while a budget of €1.6 billion should be allocated to 
the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) 
to continue supporting workers adjusting to major 
structural changes caused by globalisation. 
The proposed InvestEU Programme is also a good tool 
to	finance	projects	in	social	innovation,	skills	and	
education, healthcare and integration of vulnerable 
groups, thus contributing to the implementation of the 
Pillar. Lastly, in its Recommendation on access to social 
protection, the Council also invited the Commission 
to support member states’ efforts to promote access to 
social protection by mobilising funds from the relevant 
Union programmes.
Lastly, the European Commission has been active in the 
field	of	education	and	training.	In	2010,	it	launched	the	
Digital Agenda for Europe211 as part of its Europe 2020 
Strategy to maximise the social and economic potential of 
ICTs. Building on this background, Commission President 
Juncker announced the creation of a connected Digital 
Single Market (DSM)212 in 2014, aiming to pursue three 
major objectives: (1) providing better access to online 
goods and services across Europe; (2) creating the right 
environment	for	digital	networks	to	flourish;	and	(3)	
maximising the growth potential of the European digital 
economy.
Within the DSM Strategy, the Commission also 
recognised the need to promote and increase digital 
skills and expertise to meet the ever-increasing demand 
for digitally skilled workers. In this vein, the digital and 
skills agendas seem to go hand in hand. In fact, digital 
competences form part of initiatives that the Commission 
has taken to strengthen human capital and enhance skills. 
In 2016, the Commission launched its New Skills Agenda 
for Europe,213	which	has	a	specific	focus	on	digital	skills	
and the need for member states to invest more in digital 
skills formation across the entire spectrum of education 
and training. 
The EU’s original ambition has tended to 
be scaled down throughout the negotiation 
process with member states.
Despite	significant	progress,	it	is	important	to	highlight	
the limitations of the ongoing measures. First and 
foremost, one can notice that some of the solutions 
brought up so far, in particular the Directive on 
Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions, fail 
to address the entire problem at stake. In fact, while it 
provides	considerable	improvements	for	workers	fulfilling	
the	criteria	of	an	employment	relationship	defined	by	
the CJEU, it excludes self-employed persons, not least 
the ‘bogus self-employed’ who are among the most 
vulnerable. In addition, legal experts have highlighted 
that while the employment relationship of platform 
workers could be easily recognised for some, this is not 
the case for a crowd-worker who falls outside the scope of 
the Directive. 
Another noteworthy point is that the EU’s original 
ambition has tended to be scaled down throughout the 
negotiation process with member states. For instance, 
when considering the Council Recommendation on access 
to social protection for workers and the self-employed, 
the initial ambition of the European Commission was to 
propose a Directive. In the same vein, the initial ambit 
of the Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working 
Conditions	was	to	provide	a	codified	definition	of	a	
worker derived from the CJEU’s case-law.214 In addition, 
it is important to bear in mind that the Pillar remains 
a non-binding document. Its implementation depends 
therefore on member states’ good will and interpretation.
4.4  INTERIM CONCLUSIONS
This chapter indicates how the changing nature of work 
has crystallised public attention in recent years and 
provided fertile ground for the proliferation of initiatives 
undertaken at different policy levels and by various 
actors. This has made public authorities particularly 
sensitive to the possible consequences for our welfare 
system, our social contract and societies in general. 
In one sense, it reveals the discrepancy between the 
established functioning of our welfare regime and new 
economic and social realities it has to cope with. Another 
aspect is the transitional nature of the phase Europe 
finds	itself	in,	where	a	multitude	of	actors	attempt	to	
fill	in	existing	gaps,	address	workers’	claims,	and/or	
provide their own solutions to a tremendous challenge. 
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While these initiatives are very positive in the short run 
and must be warmly welcomed as they respond to the 
immediate needs of certain workers, the welfare state 
should also identify how all of these new measures can 
coexist	in	order	to	create	a	level	playing	field	for	workers.	
Thus, the coordination of ongoing initiatives is highly 
needed to achieve comprehensive solutions that can 
fit	the	ever	more	complex	realities	of	today’s	world	of	
work. In the absence of such coordination, there is a risk 
of ending up with a patchwork of piecemeal measures 
rather	than	a	fully-fledged	strategy	on	how	to	address	
the	diversification	of	work	arrangements.	The	question	
of	how	to	define	a	social	contract	that	is	fit	for	the	future	
should lie at the core of such strategy. 
Finally, this chapter has shown how the future of work 
is gradually making its mark on public authorities’ 
reform agendas. While inspiring reforms take place 
at the national level, the EU and international levels 
are also becoming increasingly attentive to the effects 
of labour market transformations. As regards the 
European level, recent measures, in particular the EPSR 
and its mainstreaming into the European Semester 
and	EU	financing	instruments,	represent	major	policy	
developments, which should be warmly welcomed. 
However, there are important limitations to existing EU 
initiatives that make the success of its future of work 
agenda highly dependent on cooperation with and the 
support of other players, such as national authorities 
courts of justice, and social partners.
There are important limitations to existing 
EU initiatives that make the success of its 
future of work agenda highly dependent on 
cooperation with and the support of other 
players, such as national authorities courts 
of justice, and social partners.
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Chapter 5: Solutions for a progressive agenda on 
the Future of Work
The previous chapters of this study highlighted the 
transformations that are currently shaping European 
labour	markets,	the	difficulties	they	pose	for	workers,	
society and our welfare system, and the plethora 
of initiatives to develop new solutions to emerging 
challenges. Despite the importance of such initiatives 
in stressing the dichotomy between new labour market 
realities and the current social protection system, and 
their relevance to testing new solutions, this study has 
also shown that preserving our social contract requires 
more than a patchwork of measures. 
Europe is currently in a transition period where 
labour market changes are testing the resilience of the 
established institutional and regulatory framework, and 
gradually dismantling it. This transition gives rise to a 
number of phenomena described earlier in this Issue 
Paper. They include the emergence of various economic 
actors trying to either take advantage of existing 
loopholes or weave their way into the new realities, 
mounting frictions between economic actors and the 
state, new forms of inequality, and the development of 
social innovation which is vehemently trying to offer new 
solutions to economic, social and societal challenges.
In the midst of this transition period, the EU and its 
member states are faced with two options: to either 
allow this period to take its course and give free rein to 
market forces, thus accepting the gradual dismantling of 
our welfare state, or unleash systemic changes that can 
live up to the enormity of current challenges.
This chapter will present a number of policy 
recommendations that have the potential to unleash 
systemic	changes	and	allow	for	a	redefined	alignment	of	
technological advances, the functioning of welfare states 
and working structures. Each of these recommendations 
is underpinned by concrete actions requiring the support 
and	involvement	of	specific	stakeholders.	Particular	focus	
is given to the role of the EU. The objectives of such actions 
are both to guarantee an inclusive and competitive labour 
market while shaping a social protection system that is 
future-fit.	In	fact,	it	would	be	wrong	to	address	these	two	
areas separately, as the future of the labour market and the 
social protection system are in reality closely interlinked. 
Europe is currently in a transition 
period where labour market changes are 
testing the resilience of the established 
institutional and regulatory framework, 
and gradually dismantling it.
While the functioning of the social protection system 
should take new employment realities into account, the 
performance and inclusiveness of the labour market 
contribute to the sustainability of the social protection 
system. Therefore, the reforms undertaken in each of 
these two areas must become mutually reinforcing. 
Figure 23 below summarises the systemic changes that 
are	necessary	for	the	so-called	redefined	alignment.	
They are presented in depth in the following sections. 
ALIGNMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES, WELFARE STATE REFORMS
AND WORKING STRUCTURES
A future-fit
social
protection
system
Align the social protection system
with life-course transitions
Establish a social level
playing field for all workers
Increase people’s
financial resilience
Sustain the social contract
through fair taxation
An inclusive
and
competitive
labour
market
Make learning a duty
and a right for all
Shape the talents
of the 21st century
Make social dialogue an enabler
of industrial transformations
 Fig. 23 
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5.1  TOWARDS AN INCLUSIVE AND 
COMPETITIVE LABOUR MARKET
q  Shape the talents of the 21st century 
Chapter 1 shows that the EU is losing ground to other 
regions of the world when it comes to innovation and 
technological leadership at the global level. Therefore, 
strengthening the EU’s know-how in new technologies 
and fostering their faster and broader application in 
European businesses are imperative for Europe’s future 
competitiveness, the health of its economy and job 
creation.	To	do	so,	three	specific	actions	need	to	take	
high priority.
Strengthening the EU’s know-how in new 
technologies and fostering their faster 
and broader application in European 
businesses are key to Europe’s future 
competitiveness, the health of its economy 
and job creation.
First and foremost, there is an urgent need to spread 
digital literacy across all groups of the labour force and 
democratise access to digital skills, which is far from 
being the reality today. Digital skills remain unevenly 
distributed across age groups, educational levels, genders 
and household income. Given that almost all jobs require 
at least basic digital skills, the EU cannot afford to ignore 
a large part of its labour force by not investing in digital 
literacy. Digital skills should be taught from an early age 
and integrated into school curricula. More efforts must 
also be put into the training of teachers so that they feel 
comfortable using digital devices in their classrooms and 
into the adequate equipment of schools. Programmes 
aiming at the labour market integration of vulnerable 
young people should also entail strong digital elements. 
In that respect, inspiring programmes exist across Europe 
(sometimes supported by the EU itself) and their visibility 
needs to be reinforced, not least through an even better 
outreach of already existing initiatives, such as the All 
Digital Week or the Europe Code Week. However, it 
is important to recall that it is not young people who 
are most affected by digital illiteracy. Senior workers 
struggle disproportionately to cope with the fast-paced 
digitalisation of our economy. Intensifying the support 
measures towards this target group is therefore crucial. 
It needs to be done through programmes delivered by 
employment agencies, but also through the deployment 
of lifelong learning opportunities when people are still in 
employment (see following section). 
While basic digital skills are a necessity, they will 
not	suffice	to	make	the	EU	a	world	champion	in	new	
technologies. To this end, the EU should train tech-savvy 
specialists and increase its capacity to attract digital 
talent. Chapter 1 indicates that the EU is lagging behind 
in that respect, as compared to other regions of the world 
(i.e. US, Asia). To reverse this worrying trend, the EU must 
develop	and	finance	research	and	training	programmes	
in advanced digital technologies at the university level 
and ensure that Europe is home to some of the top 
universities in this area. Pooling research centres and 
creating a benchmark of European universities in the 
field	of	digital	technologies	are	examples	of	concrete	
initiatives the EU could take. However, good universities 
are not the only determinant for retaining talent in 
Europe. They must be part of an ecosystem with research 
centres and industries, where fundamental and applied 
research can nurture one another. Such ecosystems 
of advanced digital technologies need to be given top 
priority in existing and future EU policies, not least in the 
context of the smart specialisation strategy and cohesion 
policy.
Lastly, mastering technologies and having at least a 
moderate level of digital skills will need to be combined 
with other assets, in particular cognitive and non-
cognitive skills. Businesses that are most likely to 
succeed in tomorrow’s labour market are those which 
will bring together a high and optimal integration of new 
technologies, strong capacity to understand and anticipate 
market needs/gaps, as well as robust management and 
financial	capacities.	In	fact,	while	machines	will	mostly	
replace human labour in the case of discrete, repetitive 
and predictable tasks215 in the future, they will still rely on 
workers to develop, maintain and upgrade technologies 
as well as integrate them into business models. Thus, 
business development and management are examples of 
cognitive skills that will be in high demand. 
At the same time, advanced technologies will create 
new needs to interpret, tailor and explain data inputs. 
Understanding customers’ expectations, working in 
teams and being able to deal with unforeseen scenarios 
that are not anticipated by machines in a short time 
frame will require non-cognitive skills such as emotional 
control, openness to learn and adapt, problem-solving, 
sociability and creativity. This complex mix of skills 
needs	to	be	carefully	reflected	in	school	curricula	and	
further supported by European initiatives. Thus, EU 
programmes aiming at the education and training of the 
(future)	workforce,	such	as	the	ones	financed	through	
the	ESF+,	should	give	proper	consideration	to	such	new	
realities and integrate this association of skills as one of 
their major end objectives. 
q  Make learning a duty and a right for all 
All research and information reported by businesses 
point to a profound skills mismatch and shortages on the 
labour market, which are likely to be further aggravated 
without important reforms of how knowledge, in a 
broad sense, is delivered. While the need to increase 
investment in digital and technological skills has already 
been addressed, the delivery of knowledge, skills and 
competences deserves equal attention.
This Paper has highlighted (mainly in Chapter 1) the 
tremendous unmet demand for up- and reskilling, thus 
revealing the limited access to training, the lack of offers 
on	the	market	and	the	insufficient	investment	by	private	
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and public entities. The continuous and rapid pace of 
technological innovation calls for a complete overhaul of 
how learning is perceived in society and how it is delivered 
to people. Too often, the education system prepares 
students	for	one	specific	occupation	with	a	precise	set	of	
tasks, whereas people are increasingly likely to change jobs 
numerous times throughout their career. And even if they 
hold the same occupation throughout their professional 
life, their job content will alter due to the introduction of 
new technologies. 
Once people are in employment, they struggle to learn 
new skills and develop competences in areas they have not 
received formal training. Europe appears to be particularly 
bad at providing bridges across occupations and skills. As 
indicated in Chapter 1, the case of AI is a good example, 
with evidence showing that becoming an AI specialist once 
employed	is	far	more	difficult	in	the	EU	than	in	the	US.	
Another characteristic of training programmes is that they 
tend	to	benefit	higher	skilled	segments	of	the	workforce	
more than lower skilled workers, i.e. those who need it 
most. The root causes of this phenomenon are likely to 
be linked to the following factors: training programmes 
are under-represented in industries or sectors where low 
skilled workers are over-represented; such workers might 
be less proactive than high skilled people to seek and ask 
for training opportunities; and, in a context of labour 
market polarisation and over-supply of low skilled workers, 
companies might be more interested in investing in high 
skilled labour, as the return on investment is likely to be 
higher. Thus, training opportunities become a competitive 
advantage in a ‘war for talent’, even though the logic 
mainly applies to the high skill market. This is a worrying 
trend as such a phenomenon will keep reinforcing the 
already unfolding labour market polarisation. 
The continuous and rapid pace of 
technological innovation calls for a 
complete overhaul of how learning is 
perceived in society and how it is  
delivered to people.
Implementing a complete overhaul of how learning 
opportunities are delivered to workers will require 
three	elements:	flexibility,	adaptation	and	cooperation.	
Flexibility will be required to integrate fast-changing 
technologies and evolving labour market needs. Adapting 
to territorial circumstances will also be vital to ensure a 
better match between labour supply and demand on local 
labour markets. Finally, cooperation between governments, 
the education system and businesses will contribute to the 
success of up- and reskilling programmes.
Together with this complete overhaul, two distinct 
priorities	need	to	be	set	simultaneously.	The	first,	which	
is in line with Principle 1 of the EPSR,216 is to make 
lifelong learning a right for everyone by changing how it 
is delivered to people. Workers should have equal rights 
regardless of their employment status, industry and the 
company they work in. Several reforms could support 
this priority. Individual learning accounts, such as the 
one recently established in France, is an interesting tool 
to guarantee equal rights and facilitate a better match 
between demand and supply. The offer of online courses 
for up- and reskilling then needs to grow exponentially 
through public support and incentives for universities to 
develop such tools. Lastly, there should be obligations for 
companies to invest in their human capital, which should 
be supported by tax incentives.217  
Workers should have equal rights 
regardless of their employment status, 
industry and the company they work in.
The second priority is to concentrate efforts on those 
workers who need it most. The current focus of certain EU 
instruments, such as the EGF, is placed on workers who 
are directly affected by structural changes in world-trade 
patterns or shifts in the labour market that are induced 
by globalisation or digitalisation. While this support is 
relevant and necessary, there is also a need to assist low 
skilled workers who are not at immediate risk of dismissal 
but are trapped in a low skilled and low wage job which 
offers little to no chance of climbing the skill ladder. This 
requires a more anticipatory approach in the support 
programmes developed at the EU and national levels and 
a strong cooperation with respective industries that are 
best placed to inform how the market, and the consequent 
skills requirements, are evolving. Pre-consultations with 
the industries and a sound understanding of market needs 
must therefore become a standard feature of the territorial 
implementation of EU programmes dedicated to education 
and training. 
q  Make social dialogue an enabler of industrial 
transformations
In line with the human-centred agenda proposed by 
the ILO, the authors of this Issue Paper believe that 
technological developments need to be steered and 
controlled by humans. The impact of the fourth industrial 
revolution and its level of disruption of jobs is indeed 
not predetermined and will largely depend on human 
decisions. Thus, advanced technologies can become a 
great enabler of economic and social progress, not least 
by replacing workers by machines on dangerous tasks, 
but they can also have irreversible effects – not only in 
terms of job disruption but also as regards their ethical 
implications – in the absence of any control. Therefore, 
the impact of technologies will be determined by the 
regulatory framework that humans will be able to put in 
place.
Against this background, it is essential to involve workers 
in the design of such a regulatory framework, and social 
dialogue	remains	–	despite	its	current	flaws	–	the	best	
instrument to do it. In short, in view of the profound 
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shifts labour markets are currently undergoing, an 
efficient	and	constructive	social	dialogue	where	workers,	
employers and working structures can co-design the 
solutions of tomorrow is imperative. Thus, it is key 
to guarantee a well-functioning social dialogue in all 
industrial sectors, including the ones where work is 
mediated through digital platforms, and to extend the 
coverage of collective agreements. Social dialogue will 
be particularly helpful in two respects. Firstly, it can 
contribute to anticipating and monitoring the effects of 
new technologies on job displacement, work content, 
working conditions and the overall structure of the labour 
market. Secondly, it can help curb the polarisation of 
the labour market by setting the pace for technological 
developments and ensuring that solutions are found for 
the workers most at risk before the disruption takes effect. 
In view of the profound shifts labour 
markets are currently undergoing, an 
efficient and constructive social dialogue 
where workers, employers and working 
structures can co-design the solutions of 
tomorrow is imperative. 
While the inputs of social partners on these two aspects 
should be organised according to member state traditions 
and labour market institutions, they need to span all 
industrial branches. This also implies that businesses 
need to report on their plans whenever they decide to 
make a major investment in technologies that might have 
detrimental implications for their workers. 
The objective of business reporting would not be to 
hamper technological advances but to promote a culture 
of dialogue within companies, better manage the impact 
of technological transformations and introduce a 
human	factor	in	the	cost-benefit	analysis	of	businesses	
whenever new technologies are introduced. Following 
such a bottom-up process, social partners should inform 
national roadmaps on the future of work. The objective of 
the roadmaps will be to address the numerous aspects of 
labour market transformations highlighted in this Paper 
comprehensively and proactively. 
Such roadmaps should become an integral part of broader 
national strategies on social investment, setting out 
governments’ plan to invest in human capital and equip 
people with the necessary toolkits to cope with ongoing 
changes. The European Semester needs to play a strategic 
role in that respect (e.g. by asking member states to 
develop a social investment strategy based on an analysis 
of labour market transformations in the country reports). 
While complementing the rights-based approach of the 
EPSR, this strategy should then be put into action at 
the national level, while its implementation should be 
considered	during	the	formulation	of	country-specific	
recommendations. 
5.2  TOWARDS A FUTURE-FIT SOCIAL 
PROTECTION SYSTEM
q  Establish a social level playing field for all workers
As stipulated in Principle 12 of the EPSR218 and the recent 
Council Recommendation on access to social protection, 
the latter should be guaranteed regardless of a person’s 
employment status, thus creating a social level playing 
field	for	all	workers.	Fulfilling	such	an	objective	requires	a	
set	of	complementary	actions	spanning	the	areas	of	fiscal	
policies, legislation and regulation. 
As indicated earlier in this Issue Paper, atypical workers 
often suffer from social protection gaps and lower 
effective coverage compared to people in standard forms 
of employment. To address such unequal treatment, 
member states have embarked upon a series of policy 
experiments differing in scope and level of provided 
provisions (see Chapter 4). Such experiments often follow 
a path-dependency approach based on the existing nature 
of the regulatory environment, welfare traditions and 
preferences, revealing that policy priorities are highly 
dependent on national context.
The persisting cracks in social protection, inconsistencies 
and unequal treatment reveal that welfare states are 
struggling to adapt to the new world of work. Efforts 
to turn the still prevailing piecemeal approach into a 
fully-fledged	framework	that	embraces	the	new	labour	
market complexities and anticipates new ones need to 
be	intensified.	Current	initiatives	prove	that	it	is	possible	
to align the functioning of the welfare state and its 
protection system with upcoming labour market realities 
and bridge the gap between the rights and effective 
coverage of people taking part in diverse forms of work. 
While designing such a framework falls mainly within the 
responsibility of national governments, the EU could play 
a	significant	role	in	supporting	the	transition.
Five	specific	actions	will	need	to	take	top	priority	when	
designing	such	a	fully	fledged	framework.219 These 
priorities focus on providing policy solutions to ensure 
that all workers get equal access and coverage of social 
protection. They include the following elements: (1) 
an ‘equality check’ of social protection systems with a 
minimum	social	protection	floor	for	all	workers,	(2)	a	
‘fiscal	check’	of	employment	and	labour	laws,	(3)	the	fight	
against	workers’	misclassification,	(4)	an	assessment	
of labour law reforms and new concepts, and (5) the 
regulation of digital platforms.
(1)  An ‘equality check’ of social protection systems with 
a minimum social protection floor for all workers
First,	establishing	a	social	level	playing	field	for	all	workers	
necessitates the effective implementation of a minimum 
social	protection	floor	for	all.	This	minimum	floor	must	
entail universal access to the four main components of 
social	protection,	which	are	mostly	financed	through	
contributory schemes and thereby constitute the main 
areas of inequality among workers. They include parental 
leave, sickness (including occupational injuries and work 
accidents), unemployment and old age/pension. The access 
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and	minimum	level	of	benefits	needs	to	be	equal	regardless	
of employment status, thus implying that the duration of 
benefits	as	well	as	of	the	contributory	period	required	to	
access them need to be harmonised. 
Enlarging	the	scope	of	social	protection	beneficiaries	
and ensuring universality demand a broadening of the 
contributory base. In other words, mandatory contributions 
will have to be paid by all types of workers (see the 
forthcoming recommendation on sustainability of social 
protection	systems).	An	efficient	collaboration	between	
member states and the EU would help the creation of such 
a	genuine	minimum	social	protection	floor	for	all	European	
workers tremendously. While member states would need 
to conduct an ‘equality check’ of their social protection 
system to identify current gaps and solutions, the EU could 
provide	intellectual	and	financial	support.	As	regards	the	
former, the European Semester is the ideal instrument to 
monitor national developments and help member states 
move towards an inclusive social protection system which  
provides equal and universal rights. The monitoring of 
the implementation of the Council Recommendation 
on access to social protection should become a central 
part	of	the	European	Semester	and	its	country-specific	
recommendations as well as the social investment strategy 
of each individual member state mentioned earlier. 
Establishing a social level playing field 
for all workers necessitates the effective 
implementation of a minimum social 
protection floor for all.
Furthermore, data on social protection is still very 
patchy	across	the	EU,	making	the	identification	of	gaps	
and people who are mostly at risk of falling between 
the	cracks	difficult.	The	implementation	of	the	Council	
recommendations therefore needs to be accompanied 
by strong EU guidance on data collection at the national 
level. Concerning the latter, the EU needs to identify the 
financing	instruments	that	could	support	member	states	
in the implementation of such a ‘quality check’. In this 
respect, the Structural Reform Support Programme220 
could be a useful instrument, providing administrative, 
policy	and	financial	support	to	national	administrations.
(2)  A ‘fiscal check’ of employment and labour laws
The growth of new types of work arrangements 
sometimes	reflects	a	purely	financial	logic	that	goes	
beyond economic arguments. In fact, the argument often 
advanced by employers when using atypical workers, 
that	a	flexible	labour	force	is	needed	to	adjust	labour	to	
demand	fluctuation,	does	not	always	hold	true.	In	reality,	
there	is	often	a	significant	corporate	cost	differential	
between an employment relationship with a standard 
employee and with an atypical worker. For instance, 
employers may have to pay lower contributions when 
they employ workers on a part-time basis rather than 
full-time. This is the case in the UK, where employers do 
not pay social contributions for employees earning below 
a certain threshold. This is therefore a simple way for 
employers to reduce labour costs. The same logic applies 
to self-employed workers. In this case, the absence of an 
employer means that all social contributions are covered 
by	the	worker	him/herself,	thus	shifting	the	financial	
burden to the individual. This might happen even when 
the nature of the work performed by the  
self-employed person has the same features as that 
performed by a standard employee. 
Against this background, it is imperative for member 
states	to	carry	out	a	‘fiscal	check’	of	their	employment	
and	labour	laws,	thus	ensuring	that	fiscal	rules	do	
not disadvantage certain workers and/or employers 
over	others.	In	a	nutshell,	the	diversification	of	work	
arrangements should be a decision based on genuinely 
economic factors and how new forms of contractual 
arrangement might best respond to certain economic 
imperatives. In other words, it should in no way be based 
on	fiscal	aspects	and	labour	cost	differential.	As	with	the	
‘equality check’ of national social protection systems, the 
‘fiscal	check’	of	employment	and	labour	laws	needs	to	
be fully integrated into both the European Semester and 
national social investment strategies. 
(3)  The fight against abuse and workers’ misclassification
The	presence	of	fiscal	incentives	described	above	can	
lead	to	abuse	and	the	misclassification	of	workers.	In	
some cases for instance, differential in labour costs 
also	leads	to	a	deliberate	misclassification	of	self-
employment, or in the case of crowd-work and zero-
hours contracts, people’s working time might become 
highly unpredictable. All of these forms of abuse have 
two	common	features:	the	‘real	employer’	profits	
from the cracks and grey areas in employment and 
labour laws to limit taxes and the payment of social 
contributions, while taking advantage of workers’ 
vulnerability and lack of bargaining power. 
Corrective measures must be tailored to each type of 
abuse. For instance, in the case of temporary workers, 
employment law needs to limit the use of successive 
short-term appointments and ensure that temporary 
work is a stepping stone towards more permanent jobs. 
When it comes to zero-hours contracts, implementing 
a	set	of	rules,	such	as	those	defined	in	the	Directive	on	
Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions, would 
be	helpful.	As	regards	the	misclassification	of	self-
employed workers, public authorities must strengthen 
the	controls	against	misclassification	of	workers,	and	
national courts have an extremely important role to play 
in providing a robust and coherent jurisdiction. For better 
or	worse,	no	codified	definition	of	‘worker’	is	provided	
in	EU	legislation,	only	an	autonomous	definition	based	
on the numerous decisions of the CJEU.221 It therefore 
falls within the responsibility of national labour laws 
and domestic courts to decide upon the key parameters 
of	an	employment	relationship	and	how	they	define	
an employee, a worker and a self-employed person. In 
this respect, it is worth noting the increased number of 
judgments	on	workers’	misclassification	that	national	
courts have recently dealt with. Interestingly, the 
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conclusion of many of these judgments has pointed to a 
disguised form of employment relationship, thus forcing 
corporates to reclassify the status of their workers.222 
(4)  An assessment of labour law reforms and new 
concepts – The case of the self-employed
Labour market transformations have rendered the 
traditional binary distinction between employees and 
self-employed inadequate. In fact, the economic freedom 
enjoyed by an increased number of self-employed 
workers is severely restricted. In other words, and as 
highlighted	by	Risak	and	Dullinger,	“these	new	‘solo-
entrepreneurs’ and freelancers are very different from 
those of the past, where ‘liberal professions’ such as 
lawyers, architects and other high-skilled professionals 
had the power to bargain for high remuneration and 
controlled their own working conditions”.223 This new 
reality has already led numerous countries – including 
Spain,	Italy,	France	(for	some	sectoral-specific	cases),	
Germany and Austria – to recognise that there is an 
intermediary category of workers falling in between 
employment and self-employment. They are called 
the ‘dependent’ or ‘vulnerable self-employed’. In these 
countries, legislative measures have been undertaken to 
safeguard the legal status of these workers and guarantee 
their access to and coverage by social protection. The key 
criterion to determine their status is often their economic 
dependency (i.e. the fact that their income depends on a 
limited number of contractual partners). 
Labour market transformations have 
rendered the traditional binary distinction 
between employees and self-employed 
inadequate.
Such practices should be debated more among member 
states and at the European level. In particular, some work 
and research must be invested into analysing the social 
protection coverage of these ‘dependent self-employed’, 
while trying to draw conclusions on whether such a new 
category might be a suitable solution. With the creation 
of such an intermediary category, legal provisions 
protecting dependent self-employed workers against a 
race to the bottom, enhancing their contributory capacity, 
and enabling them to contribute to the social welfare 
system need to be examined. In the same vein, existing 
competition law, whereby self-employed workers are 
prohibited	from	fixing	their	tariffs,	needs	to	be	revisited	
so that dependent self-employed workers can charge a 
minimum fee for their services. Interestingly, this is the 
approach followed by the current Dutch government, 
which is trying to protect this category of workers 
against poverty. The idea is that a minimum rate would 
not only enable the self-employed to pay their social 
contributions, but would also provide them with a wage 
premium	that	would	compensate	for	their	flexibility.	
Furthermore, persons belonging to this category should 
be covered by collective agreements and have access to 
unemployment	benefits.	Exploring	possible	solutions	and	
analysing the impact of these legal provisions should be 
the European Commission’s top priority when monitoring 
the implementation of the Council Recommendation with 
regards to access to social protection. At the same time, 
this topic should become the subject of mutual leaning and 
exchange of best practices across member states. 
The notion of economic dependency needs to also become 
a	central	piece	of	EU	law.	Until	now,	the	identification	of	
an employment relationship has been mostly judged in 
the light of a relationship of personal subordination in the 
case law of the CJEU. As claimed by Risak and Dullinger, 
it is now time for the CJEU to move beyond this narrow 
concept of ‘worker’ and integrate economic arguments 
that	better	reflect	the	vulnerability	of	the	dependent	self-
employed.224 By doing so, the scope of protection of existing 
and upcoming EU labour regulations could be enlarged to 
this group of people without leaving it to the discretion of 
member states and national courts. 
(5)  The regulation of digital platforms
The	specific	and	complex	case	of	platform	workers	has	
already been highlighted in this Issue Paper. The diversity 
of	platforms,	their	specificities	and	the	various	roles	they	
play in a worker’s income makes any regulation particularly 
challenging. However, and despite the so far limited 
phenomenon of platform work across the EU28, variations 
across	countries	–	2.7%	of	the	Dutch	labour	force	working	
on	platforms	as	their	main	job	compared	to	0.6%	in	
Finland – points to the role regulation plays in curbing or 
facilitating this form of work.
The distinction made earlier between app-based work 
delivered locally and crowd-based work provided in 
a	global	environment	needs	to	be	reflected	in	the	
regulation. While the policy framework required for 
workers	taking	part	in	the	first	category	of	platforms	falls	
within the solutions already suggested above – given 
that such platform workers are generally working under 
the self-employed status –, the second category is more 
complex. In fact, as their services are provided online 
through platforms which are generally located outside 
national and sometimes even European borders, it is 
extremely challenging to track them, identify the party 
responsible for contributing to social insurance and 
ensure the payment of all due taxes. 
In addition to the cross-border dimension, the novelty 
of the phenomenon adds another layer of complexity. 
Notwithstanding, a number of new measures could be 
particularly helpful to regulate the sector, including the 
obligation for digital platforms to take part in social 
dialogue and enter into collective agreements; dedicated 
efforts by trade unions, which would be supported and 
coordinated by public authorities to reach out to and 
represent platform workers (or alternatively to organise 
worker councils); as well as the obligation for digital 
platforms to report on the number of service providers in 
each country and their corresponding number of hours 
worked as a means to assess the revenue they generate in 
each country. All of these measures could be facilitated by 
digital technologies. Evidently, designing comprehensive 
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regulations on issues of a global nature is not an easy 
task. Nonetheless, governments should start somewhere 
and not concede defeat. They should bring their efforts 
and strengths together to identify the best solutions 
and work jointly towards concrete achievements. In this 
respect,	the	EU	should	act	as	a	driving	force	by,	in	the	first	
stage, launching a comprehensive roadmap dealing with 
all the consequences of platform work and assessing the 
feasibility and adequacy of different policy solutions. In 
the second stage, it should lead on shaping solutions at 
the international level. 
q  Align the social protection system with life-course 
transitions
As already mentioned, professional lives are becoming 
increasingly complex and often involve several employers 
and jobs. Working for different employers and in different 
environments can be a great asset to one’s professional 
life as well as to the economy. In fact, people with diverse 
professional experiences might be more agile and able to 
deal with complex situations and draw lessons from previous 
working environments. However, such potential is not 
properly exploited in the current labour market. In reality, 
workers are often not incentivised to transit between jobs or 
move from one professional status to another as they fear 
losing	the	accumulated	benefits	that	are	often	attached	to	
their most recent employer. This issue is a major hindrance 
to labour market mobility, entrepreneurship and the health 
and dynamism of our economy in general.
To reverse this, public authorities should ensure that 
multiple and diverse work experiences do not equal less 
financial	security	and	reduced	social	provisions.	To	do	so,	
guaranteeing the portability of rights across employers 
and employment statuses is imperative. Adequate 
coordination mechanisms must therefore be established 
to	allow	workers	to	keep	and	transfer	the	benefits	they	
have accumulated throughout their professional life. 
Such mechanisms also need to allow people to combine 
different work arrangements and multiple employers. 
Beside	flexibility,	transparency	is	equally	important	and	
needs to be one of the main features of such coordination 
instruments. Thus, the principles of coordination and 
transferability of rights need to be turned into concrete 
instruments, such as a smart card and/or individual 
accounts where people can easily access a full overview of 
their	rights	and	benefits.	Such	accounts	should	centralise	
all the contributions of the corresponding rights and 
benefits	made	throughout	an	individual’s	career	path.	
Efforts and actions at both the national and European 
levels are necessary to align the social protection system 
with life-course transitions. The proliferation of actors 
and initiatives delivering social protection provisions 
explained in Chapter 4 makes the creation of a uniform 
and centralised system of information particularly 
challenging. This proliferation therefore needs to be 
adequately managed by public authorities, which must 
guarantee the reliability of new emerging actors. As for 
the EU level, initiatives in the realm of the exchange of 
best practices would be particularly helpful in assessing 
the impact of such smart card and/or individual accounts 
and maximising mutual learning among member states. 
q  Increase people’s financial resilience
Chapter 2 has shown that atypical workers share a certain 
number of concerns and insecurities. Addressing them 
requires important changes in the social protection system, 
as indicated earlier. However, given the growing complexity 
of individuals’ professional careers, which have become 
less linear, it is essential to increase people’s awareness 
about how they can cope with expected long-term changes, 
such as old age, or unexpected short-term socioeconomic 
risks,	such	as	sickness	or	job	loss.	Obtaining	sufficient	
and transparent information and feeling adequately 
protected against such life events can play a major role in 
mitigating people’s fears and anxieties. This would also 
be a determinant factor in encouraging people to become 
more entrepreneurial and take risks. 
Three concrete measures would be particularly useful in 
this respect: 
1.  People need to better understand the functioning 
of their social protection system (including 
pensions) and the constraints most welfare regimes 
face in terms of sustainability. In this respect, it 
is striking to note that graduates have little to no 
knowledge of how socioeconomic models function 
and that workers are often unaware of the provisions 
they are entitled to. Integrating basic knowledge into 
school curricula is therefore key. 
2.  Public authorities need to strengthen awareness-
raising campaigns towards atypical workers about 
the importance and relevance of certain insurance 
products. This is even more important when public 
welfare provisions are not generous enough to cover 
certain risks. Such guidance could, for instance, be 
provided during information meetings when people 
register as self-employed. 
3.  Self-employed people need to become better 
protected against possible risks, including 
unemployment. In this respect, mandatory enrolment 
into a ‘pooled’ income insurance provided by either the 
state or a private company is necessary. Such mandatory 
contributions should of course be coupled with other 
regulatory provisions (such as those described in the 
above sections), allowing self-employed people to afford 
the payment of such contributions. 
q  Sustain the social contract through fair taxation
The	question	of	how	to	finance	the	social	protection	
system plays a central role in its long-term sustainability 
and the viability of our welfare system. This aspect is 
too often neglected by most studies dealing with the 
future of social protection. Moreover, preserving the 
main principles of our welfare system, based on solidarity 
and redistributive mechanisms and therefore our 
social contract, will require an effective and increased 
mobilisation of revenue. 
Two	main	sources	of	revenue	contribute	to	the	financing	
of social protection today: social contributions paid by 
both employers and workers, and general taxation. By 
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highlighting	the	diversification	of	work	arrangements	and	
the growing tendency to decouple social protection from 
employment, adding to other factors such as demographic 
ageing and unemployment, this Issue Paper has shown how 
the erosion of the contributory base for social insurance is 
set to deteriorate, and in so doing, puts our entire welfare 
system at risk. This decoupling process therefore poses a 
fundamental question for European welfare states: are we 
ready to abandon and unravel the foundations of previous 
decades and accept that employment will no longer be the 
lynchpin of our social protection system?  
By doing so, and if the objective is to maintain the core 
principles of our social contract, new solutions will have 
to be found, not least to enable millions of Europeans to 
obtain effective minimum social provisions. Theoretically, 
a	system	financed	only	through	general	taxation	could	be	
an alternative. However, it raises the question of whether 
it would lead to a fair balance of responsibilities between 
workers and employers. The former will still have to pay 
social	contributions,	while	it	will	become	extremely	difficult	
to ensure that the latter will contribute their fair share to 
the public good in exchange for their use of labour. Another 
proposal, also suggested as a supplementary measure to 
the	previous	one,	is	to	broaden	the	existing	fiscal	space	by	
finding	new	financial	resources	(e.g.	by	raising	taxes	on	gas	
emissions,	financial	transactions	or	robots).	
The suitability of each of these new sources of revenue 
merits special attention and detailed analysis, which go 
beyond the scope of this Paper. However, a number of 
caveats can already be raised at this point. Firstly, it is 
doubtful that any of these new sources of revenue would be 
able to compensate for the loss of employers’ contributions 
and respond to the coverage needs of our future social 
protection system. Secondly, many of them would still 
leave the question of the responsibility of employers 
towards their workers and their contribution to the public 
good unanswered. Thirdly, removing the traditional link 
between employment and social protection might introduce 
another challenge. Workers could choose to take care of 
their own social provisions, thus forcing the state to replace 
mandatory contributions by voluntary ones. As experiences 
have shown, many people who have the possibility to opt 
into certain schemes do not do so for a variety of reasons. 
This leads to increased risk of poverty, social exclusion and 
greater inequality.
It is certain that no robust solution ensuring an 
equilibrium between the greater needs for social 
protection	and	the	efficiency	and	adequacy	of	financial	
resources has yet been found. Until this fundamental 
question has been resolved, unravelling the foundations 
of past decades is a risky endeavour with serious 
consequences for individuals and society at large.
5.3  INTERIM CONCLUSIONS
This chapter presents the main actions that should underpin 
a progressive agenda on the future of work in Europe, 
while keeping the bigger question of the sustainability 
of European welfare states and the viability of the social 
contract in mind. Turning such ambition into a reality 
would require both a virtuous relationship between the 
labour market and the social protection system as well as 
a	redefined	alignment	of	technological	advances,	welfare	
state reforms and working structures. This alignment must 
be based on a number of systemic changes stemming from 
both a recalibration of past achievements as well as new 
approaches and instruments. 
On the one hand, competitive and inclusive labour 
markets call for the ability to shape the talents of the 
21st	century,	who	will	have	to	reflect	the	need	for	a	
complex set of skills combining technological know-
how as well as cognitive and non-cognitive skills. In 
addition, our societies must undergo a complete overhaul 
of how continuous learning is delivered to people, 
thus making it a duty and a right for all. Lastly, the 
profound shifts labour market are undergoing require 
employers, workers and working structures to co-design 
the solutions of tomorrow. Social dialogue remains the 
best channel to achieve this and could become, if more 
efficient	and	constructive,	a	great	enabler	of	industrial	
transformations. 
On	the	other	hand,	a	future-fit	social	protection	system	
needs	to	be	based	on	a	social	level	playing	field	for	all	
workers establishing a minimum social protection for all. 
This would require an ‘equality’ check of social protection 
systems,	a	‘fiscal	check’	of	employment	and	labour	laws,	
the	fight	against	abuse	and	workers’	misclassification,	an	
assessment of labour law reforms and the regulation of 
digital platforms. In parallel, social protection systems 
will need to be aligned with life-course transitions, not 
least through the effective portability of workers’ rights; 
and	people’s	financial	resilience,	including	atypical	
workers’, will have to be increased to cope with the growing 
complexities of the labour market and the emergence of 
new socioeconomic risks. Lastly, the fundamental question 
of	how	to	finance	the	social	protection	system	in	view	
of the growing decoupling of employment and social 
protection will have to be answered and put at the centre 
of the public debate on how to sustain the social contract 
through fair taxation. 
To achieve this objective, such changes need to be 
supported by a wide range of actors, including employers, 
trade unions, the CJEU and national courts. The role of 
national authorities and EU institutions will be central 
in	this	joint	endeavour,	and	finding	the	right	ways	to	
complement one another’s actions will be fundamental. In 
this respect, the authors suggest to make the best use of 
existing EU instruments, such as the European Semester, 
funds, digital initiatives and mutual learning, and 
mainstream the recommendations highlighted in Chapter 
5 through these various channels. Moreover, at the core 
of the interaction between the EU and its member states 
should be the development of national social investment 
strategies based on national roadmaps on the future of 
work. Such strategies should set out how member states 
intend to address the various challenges raised by the new 
world of work and complement the rights-based approach 
provided by the EPSR. They must form a central part of the 
European Semester’s country reports and the formulation 
of	its	country-specific	recommendations.	
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Conclusions
European labour markets are undergoing profound 
transformations triggered by the current challenges 
and mega-trends, thereby giving rise to a new techno-
economic paradigm. This new paradigm calls for a 
redefined	alignment	of	technological	advances,	welfare	
state reforms and working structures. This Issue 
Paper has highlighted the complexity and frictions 
generated by such transformations, shown their deep 
and long-lasting repercussions for individuals and 
society	at	large	and	identified	how	the	creation	of	a	
virtuous relationship between inclusive and competitive 
labour	markets	on	the	one	hand,	and	future-fit	social	
protection systems on the other, should lie at the core 
of a progressive agenda on the future of work. This 
virtuous relationship needs to be underpinned by a 
series of systemic changes that are presented in this 
Issue Paper. 
The role of the EU in steering such a 
progressive agenda and supporting the 
development of more agile welfare states 
in the age of increased labour market 
complexities will be decisive for its future.
Such systemic changes in no way mean a rupture 
with past achievements. Labour markets and welfare 
states are the result of a complex history of successive 
developments with constant, although often painful, 
adaptation. This historical legacy, including welfare 
provisions, labour market institutions and social 
dialogue, should help Europe create solutions for 
tomorrow. Thus, systemic changes will consist of a 
recalibration of past achievements which should be 
complemented with new instruments, such as national 
social investment strategies, and adapted to the 
increased complexity of today’s realities. The conscious, 
mature and controlled deployment of advanced 
technologies	should	be	used	towards	this	redefined	
alignment. 
Besides the fact that systemic changes are necessary 
to make our welfare system sustainable in the long 
run,	they	will	also	have	a	number	of	significant	overall	
benefits.	Firstly,	they	will	allow	the	deployment	of	new	
technologies while tapping into their full potential to 
bring about innovative solutions to our societies and 
harness	their	economic	benefits.	Secondly,	they	will	
inject	new	life	into	our	social	contract	by	clearly	defining	
the responsibility of each part of society to contribute to 
the public good, offering new prospects for all, curbing 
new forms of inequality and addressing the concerns 
and fears of people who perceive themselves to be the 
losers of ongoing transformations. 
The role of the EU in steering such a progressive agenda 
and supporting the development of more agile welfare 
states in the age of increased labour market complexities 
will be decisive for its future. This will, however, not be 
an easy task. At a time when there is a clear preference 
for nationalistic solutions and a strong resistance from 
certain member states to cooperate on employment 
and social matters, the EU’s ambition will undoubtedly 
face vehement opposition. Therefore, besides the level 
of ambition and quality of the EU’s policy agenda, its 
political leadership will be central in mobilising the forces 
of	change.	Moreover,	the	long-term	benefits	would	also	
be	significant.	By	meeting	the	challenges	posed	by	the	
fourth industrial revolution, the EU would not only boost 
its economy, curb mounting divergences across European 
territories and people, and preserve its core values of 
solidarity and equality. It would also act as a driving force 
for innovative and progressive change, thus strengthening 
its	normative	power	and	influence	at	the	global	level	and	
reinforcing people’s trust in its ability to address their fears 
and anxieties. 
This Paper aims to contribute to the fundamental debate 
surrounding the future of work concept. Although it 
might not provide an answer to all questions, it will 
hopefully inspire policymakers to tackle emerging 
challenges and provide a solid toolkit for the next 
generation of EU leaders. 
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Annex 1: List of platform work categories
Label
Service classification Platform classification
Share of 
platforms in 
total number 
of platforms
Share of 
workers in 
total number 
of workers
Examples
Skills level
Format 
of service 
provision
Scale  
of tasks Selector
Form of 
matching
On-location client-
determined routine 
work
Low On-location Larger Client Offer 13.7% 1.3% GoMore
On-location platform-
determined routine 
work
Low On-location Larger Platform Offer 31.5% 31.2% Uber
On-location 
client-determined 
moderately skilled 
work
Low to 
Medium On-location Larger Client Offer 11.3% 10.9% Oferia
On-location worker-
initiated moderately 
skilled work
Low to 
Medium On-location Larger Worker Offer 4.2% 5.5% ListMinut
Online moderately 
skilled click-work Medium Online Micro Platform Offer 0.6% 5.3% CrowdFlower
On-location 
client-determined 
higher-skilled work
Medium On-location Larger Client Offer 2.4% 3.3% appJobber
On-location  
platform-determined 
higher-skilled work
Medium On-location Larger Platform Offer 1.2% 4.2% Be My Eyes
Online platform- 
determined higher-
skilled work
Medium  
to high Online Larger Platform Offer 0.6% 1.9% Clickworker
Online client-
determined specialist 
work
Medium  
to High Online Larger Client Offer 5.4% 30.3% Freelancer
Online contestant 
specialist work High Online Larger Client Contest 5.4% 4.6% 99designs
 
Source: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2018), Digital age: Employment and working conditions of 
selected types of platform work, Luxembourg: European Union.
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